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2Dissertation Synopsis
This dissertation examines the intellectual and historical roots of the Anglo-American
“Special Relationship,” most notably Anglo-Saxonism and social Darwinism, and their effect
on the noted policy organs of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (or Chatham House)
and the Council on Foreign Relations (or the Council). It first traces the origins of Anglo-
Saxonism and considers its effect on important historical events such as the Spanish-
American War and the Second Boer War. This thesis also presents a definition of Anglo-
Saxonism which appreciates the complexity of the term and allows a better understanding of
its effects. It then shows the memberships of both groups were strongly affected by these
Victorian and Edwardian phenomena, a fact which augments our understanding of them.
Furthermore, this relationship between Anglo-Saxonism and Chatham House and the Council
is not fully appreciated by many modern academics. Ultimately, the language of Anglo-
Saxonism developed during the Victorian and Edwardian eras became institutionalised during
the formative years of these groups’ memberships, predisposing both to the importance of
permanent Anglo-American cooperation.
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5Introduction
The term “watershed” is often used to describe important events in history.1 Those
who employ the term intend it to convey an event’s position as a line of demarcation in
history, a moment that signals the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. The original,
scientific term “watershed,” however, expresses a meaning these authors would surely
eschew.
The Oxford English Dictionary’s primary definition of watershed is “the line
separating the waters flowing into different rivers or river basins; a narrow elevated tract of
ground between two drainage areas,” deriving from the German wasserscheide.2 An actual
watershed, therefore, marks the point at which all rivers on either side of it flow in opposite
directions, contributing nothing to any river on the other side of the watershed.
While scholars using this term can hardly be accused of claiming the periods of time
on either side of a “watershed moment” have nothing to do with one another, they often use
these moments as starting points for examinations of a period, only briefly considering or
occasionally referring to the previous period’s impact on the study in question. Much value
can be derived, therefore, from studies of these watershed moments that straddle the
watershed itself, beginning with a thorough examination of the period prior to the event, then
advancing with an assessment of the phase afterwards.
1 Dudziak, Mary, ed. September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment? (Durham: Duke UP, 2003). Mueller,
John. The Remnants of War. Ch. 3: “World War I as a Watershed Event.”( Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ., 2007)
DeLong, J. Bradford. “Post-World War II Western European Exceptionalism” in Agnew, John and Entrikin, J.
Nicholas, eds. The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor (London: Routledge, 2004) 42.
2 Oxford English Dictionary, Online Edition. Accessed via
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/226288?rskey=DtaaDW&result=1#eid on 28/3/11 at 14:55 GMT.
6Scholars and students alike often view 1919 as year zero for both the “Special
Relationship” specifically and to some extent the entire study of international relations. The
end of the Cold War has provided another “watershed barrier” beyond which fewer and fewer
scholars venture into the past. And while these events are indeed monumentally important,
considering them without the context which history alone can provide can lead to specious
scholarship.
This dissertation considers the Anglo-American history preceding and following the
watershed moment of the Paris Peace Conference and its effect on the Special (or Essential)
Relationship. Specifically, this thesis is concerned with development of closer elite
relationships between the two nations and its impact on Anglo-American relations.
Two elite policy institutes established at the Paris Peace Conference played a
significant role in this development: the American Council on Foreign Relations (CFR or the
Council) and the British Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA or Chatham House).
This dissertation will show the effect of important historical trends on the membership of
these organisations, specifically those of Anglo-Saxonism, social Darwinism, and federalism.
It will also consider prominent scholarship surrounding the CFR and Chatham House and
whether their authors have adequately or correctly taken into account the influence of these
trends.
This dissertation is not the first to recognize that these notions were an inheritance of
the previous decades. Many scholars exploring the impact of transatlantic elites during the
First World War and the subsequent interwar period, however, conduct their examinations by
considering their main subject while making occasional references to the important historical
trends and events that shaped these elites in the formation of the Special Relationship. This
7thesis will begin with a chronology of significant events and analysis of key theoretical and
intellectual developments in order to more thoroughly illuminate the primary area of concern.
This dissertation relies on research gathered from the Lothian Papers of the National
Archives of Scotland in Edinburgh, and the Lionel Curtis Papers, the Lionel Curtis Round
Table Papers, the Bryce Papers, and the Milner Papers of the Bodleian Library of Oxford.
Contemporary books, articles, and speeches are also considered, such as Charles Dilke’s
Greater Britain and John Fiske’s speech “American Political Ideas: Viewed from the
Standpoint of Universal History.” In addition to these, further primary source material is
drawn from published diaries and accounts of the Paris Peace Conference such as Harold
Nicolson’s Peacemaking 1919 and Sir James Headlam-Morley’s A Memoir of the Paris
Peace Conference 1919. The biographical reminiscences of Arnold Toynbee, Acquaintances
and Experiences, are also examined. Furthermore, this thesis’ analysis is enriched by
consideration of many articles which prominent members of the CFR and Chatham House
published before, during, and after the First World War.
This dissertation begins by examining important historical events and trends during
the Victorian and Edwardian periods through a consideration of the life of James Bryce, the
noted British academic, statesman, and diplomat. In addition to the archival research in the
Bryce Papers described above, this thesis draws upon John Seaman’s A Citizen of the World
and Edmund Ions’ James Bryce and American Democracy. Duncan Bell’s The Idea of
Greater Britain and Michael Burgess’ “The Imperial Federation Movement in Great Britain”
provide further important information and analyses of Victorian Britain which shed light on
its relations with the United States. Of special importance in this dissertation’s consideration
8of these periods is the political involvement of Oxbridge intelligentsia in Gladstone’s Liberal
Party, which is well investigated by Christopher Harvie in Lights of Liberalism.
Two important themes during this period examined in this thesis are Anglo-Saxonism
and social Darwinism. Stuart Anderson’s Race and Rapprochement is especially important
for this dissertation’s consideration of Anglo-Saxonism, while Richard Hofstadter’s Social
Darwinism in American Thought is also examined. These two terms are highly complex and
mutable; they represented different concepts at different times for different men. This
dissertation will examine these various manifestations of the terms and produce a definition
which best encapsulates their essential components and their meaning for the men of the
Council and Chatham House.
Next, this thesis considers the important historical events of closing decades of the
nineteenth century and the opening decades of the twentieth and the role in these which
Anglo-Saxonism and social Darwinism played. The two chief events considered are the
Spanish-American War and the Second Boer War. In these sections Robert Kagan’s
Dangerous Nation and Walter Mead’s Special Providence are examined; Bradford Perkin’s
The Great Rapprochement is valuable to this dissertation’s treatment of this period as well.
While obviously important, the First World War is not examined in great detail, as
meaningful analysis of the trends with which this thesis is concerned and the role they played
during the war would itself far exceed the limits of length placed upon this dissertation.
Likewise, consideration of the foreign policies of the Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson
administrations (prior to the First World War) is regrettably scant.
After this, the two primary forerunners to Chatham House and the Council, the Round
Table movement and the Inquiry, are examined. The influence of Anglo-Saxonism is clearly
9visible within the ranks of the British Round Table and the American Inquiry. The soundest
treatments of these groups are Alex May’s dissertation “The Round Table, 1910-1966” and
Lawrence Gelfand’s The Inquiry.
Finally, this dissertation investigates the RIIA and the CFR themselves in order to
determine the influence of Victorian and Edwardian events and trends. Inderjeet Parmar’s
Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy is highly important for both organisations. Once
more the influence of Anglo-Saxonism within these groups is easily identifiable. Yet, as a
brief examination of some relevant historiography shows, many scholars writing about
Chatham House and the Council seldom refer to Victorian and Edwardian influences
(specifically Anglo-Saxonism and social Darwinism), and often fail to adequately define
these complex terms when they do employ them.
This thesis asserts the historical events and trends of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries had a significant impact on the Council’s and the RIIA’s membership and
that this impact has not been fully or properly established in the majority of scholarly books
and articles examining these policy institutes. By examining these trends’ origins and
development within transatlantic elite circles and then considering their effect on the two
institutes in question, this dissertation shows these trends predisposed the American and
British delegates at Paris who established the CFR and Chatham House to the importance of
close cooperation between their two nations. These men in turn played a vital role in
institutionalising that importance and making it a cornerstone of Anglo-American relations
throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.
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An Examination in Victorian and Edwardian History and Trends
11
James Bryce
As stated above, a review of the history and trends of the period prior to the First
World War will facilitate a better understanding of the development of the Special
Relationship. As other theses show, examination of a single individual’s life may be used
effectively as a vehicle for consideration of multiple levels of society and groups within it.3
The life of James Bryce, born in 1838, offers a number of advantages for the development of
this dissertation.
First, the tremendous length of his career allows for a significant examination of some
of the trends, institutions, and individuals that affected the Anglo-American relationship
during a fifty-year period which saw a remarkable rapprochement between the two nations.
Without significant familiarity with these decades, a meaningful comprehension of the elites
around the time of the First World War will be elusive.
Second, the extreme range of his abilities and endeavours facilitates an examination
of several important areas. He was a Member of Parliament and a Cabinet Minister, a
distinguished academic and jurist, and a renowned diplomat. Politics, academia, and
diplomacy, therefore, may all be given attention in the examination of one man’s career.
Finally, Bryce’s position as the preeminent expert on America in the United Kingdom
(a distinction recognized by both sides of the Atlantic),4 his extensive correspondence with
3 E.g., Annan, Noel. Leslie Stephen, His Thought and Character in Relation to his Time (New York: AMS,
1977). Also, Richter, Melvin. The Politics of Conscience: T.H. Green and his Age (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1983).
4 As Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court speaking at a memorial service in honour of Bryce, ex-
U.S. President William Howard Taft said of Bryce’s American expertise: “He knew us better than we know
ourselves.” “Proceedings of the Ceremonies Attending the Unveiling of a Bust of James Bryce at the United
States Capitol, 12 October 1922, 67 Cong., 4 Sess., Senate Doc. 298 (Washington, D.C., 1923). As quoted in
Ions, Edmund. Bryce and American Democracy: 1870-1922 (London: Macmillan, 1968) 294.
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important men of both countries, the high social circles he inhabited, and his service as
British Ambassador to the United States all allow for a simultaneous consideration of both
nations’ elites. The figure of James Bryce, therefore, represents much of what is examined in
this dissertation.
It is also important, however, to recognize there are inherent pitfalls in attempting to
draw larger conclusions about society and history on the basis of one man’s life and letters,
even one with a career as long and varied as Bryce’s (and a catalogue of correspondence as
voluminous and diverse). It is not the intention of this thesis to do so. Rather, this somewhat
biographical portion of this dissertation will examine Bryce’s life in order to establish a
chronological backdrop for the period in question, as well as shed light on the nature of the
elites during this time in both countries. Where appropriate, this thesis will depart from the
sequential narrative of James Bryce’s life in order to consider relevant points of interest.
Having established this framework, an investigation of the intellectual influences of elite
groups before, during, and after World War I can be undertaken.
13
Reforming Liberal Elites of Oxbridge
Trinity College of Oxford admitted the young James Bryce in 1857 after some
controversy concerning his candidacy. He was a Presbyterian, a non-Conformist who would
not sign the Church of England’s Thirty-Nine Articles, as was customary for Oxford students
at the time. After some hesitancy, Trinity College yielded and accepted him as a student.5
The initial controversy surrounding Bryce’s admittance was by no means limited to
Trinity College. Liberal, secular elements within Oxford and Cambridge were chafing against
the restrictions placed upon them by the religious Tests of the Anglican Church, together with
Nonconformists like Bryce who refused to consent to them. In 1866, Oxford required
subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles and the three Articles of the Thirty-Sixth Canon to
earn a M.A. degree (which Bryce never earned because of this requirement), to serve on a
governing body, or to hold academic office. Cambridge did not impose the Tests on M.A.
candidates, but it did compel its Senate’s members to sign the Articles. Professors from both
colleges also had to submit to the tests. Finally, the individual Colleges remained free to
“enforce or to dispense with attendance on chapel-services and divinity lectures, and
otherwise to prescribe the terms upon which they may consent to receive Dissenting
5 The portions of this section concerning Bryce’s biography rest upon research of the Bryce Papers at the
Bodleian Library of Oxford as well as three biographies: Herbert Fisher’s James Bryce: Viscount Bryce of
Dechmont, O.M. Vols. I & II (London: Macmillan, 1927), Edmund Ions’ James Bryce and American
Democracy, and John Seaman’s A Citizen of the World: the Life of James Bryce (London: Tauris Academic
Studies, 2006).
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undergraduates.”6 The Oxford Reform Act of 1854 had constituted a major step toward the
reform that the increasingly potent academic liberals sought, but it was not enough.7
In fact, the Oxford Reform Act frustrated and pleased liberals in almost equal
measure. The new governing body which the act empowered, the Council, soon became
dominated by more conservative elements concerned with arresting the freefall of secularism
that seemed to be sweeping through the university. The Council was effective in frustrating
further reform efforts, but soon it was to drive liberals and Nonconformists together to look to
Parliament and the public once more to effect change.
A major step in uniting Dissenters and university liberals was the founding of the Ad
Eundem Club. This club brought together Cambridge and Oxford academics to promote
university reform. Cambridge, where restrictions on Nonconformists were not as extensive at
Oxford, enjoyed a more substantive relationship with groups of Dissenters. Clubs like these
organized Liberal academics, prompting them to ponder how they might increase their
firepower and extend the reforming spirit that was sweeping through Oxford and Cambridge
in the 1860’s further into public life.
In 1867, Bryce joined together with other young intellectuals from Oxford and
Cambridge to produce two documents that announced the ideals and goals of a new
generation of Liberal intellectuals. Continuing the reform struggles of the ancient
universities, they came together “to repeal the Tests…to dethrone irrational obscurantism and
conservative prejudice in the cause of reason” and to abolish “irrational privilege in politics
6 Harvie, Christopher. Lights of Liberalism: University Liberals and the Challenge of Democracy: 1860-86
(London: Penguin, 1976) 257-258. Quoting Brodrick, G.C. Report of Speeches on the Abolition of Tests, 3-5.
7 For the effects of the Oxford University Bill, see Engel, A. J. From Clergyman to Don: the Rise of the
Academic Profession in Nineteenth-Century Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) 56-69. For a behind-the-scenes
view on the struggles and personal rivalries surrounding the act in Oxford, see Ward, W.R. Victorian Oxford
(London: Routledge, 1965) 210-234. Generally, see Mallet, Charles. A History of the University of Oxford: Vol.
III (London: Methuen, 1927) 323-331.
15
and society, starting with an extension of franchise.”8 They hoped “that its contents [might]
help to show that the demand for a more national Parliament is not a mere cry to which it
would be folly and weakness to give way…but a conviction seriously entertained…for the
good of the whole people.”9 The young Bryce passionately asked:
Have we overthrown the power of the Crown and the power
of the feudal nobility, only to fall under the rule of wealth?
Is the Oligarchy in England…resolved to hold fast all the
power it enjoys, and declare the interests of its class to be
the interests of the State?10
Bryce’s words and those of his fellow contributors (who included Albert Venn Dicey,
Goldwin Smith, and Leslie Stephen) produced praise and disapproval. Ultimately, however,
they had little impact, “utterly ignored by the politicians – as, indeed, were constitutional
issues in general.”11 As discussed below, however, interest in constitutional issues would in
time propel many of the Essay writers to the forefront of national debate.
This group was not content with only publishing their ideas in the hope that others
might implement them on their behalf. These men hoped to help usher in a new age of
influence for the elite intelligentsia in Britain’s politics. By 1867 they found the leader of the
Liberals had become more receptive to academics in his party. William Gladstone, the “Grand
Old Man,” would at first attract the loyalty of all the members of the group that produced
Essays on Reform and Questions for a Reformed Parliament. In the general election of 1868,
fifteen academics stood as liberal candidates. Their colleagues took to the hustings for their
8 Harvie, Christopher. “Review: A Plea for Democracy: an Edited Selection from the 1867 Essays on Reform
and Questions for a Reformed Parliament. Edited by W.L. Guttsman (1967).” The Historical Journal 11 (1968):
593.
9 Preface, Essays on Reform (1867): v. Accessed online via
http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=qg6IAAAAMAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP14&dq=essays+on+reform
+and+questions+for+a+reformed+parliament&ots=g7iw0iYqa8&sig=QK3TNotDc8v_6-
Nunj6Y7Zu8cBU#v=onepage&q&f=false at 16:40 GMT on 5/3/11.
10 Bryce, James. “The Historical Aspect of Democracy” in Essays on Reform: 277.
11 Harvie, Christopher. “Ideology and Home Rule: James Bryce, A.V. Dicey and Ireland, 1880-1887.” The
English Historical Review 91 (1976): 299.
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candidacies, which were largely rural constituencies. Nine men secured seats as the Liberals
won a majority for the first time.12
By 1874, the Conservatives had reclaimed a majority and the Gladstonian fervour of
many liberal academics, despite the removal of the Tests in June 1871, had cooled. Gladstone
had never really enjoyed the full support of Liberal academics – his hesitancy to implement
reform regarding the Church of England’s role in the ancient universities and his imperialist
tendencies during the 1882 Egyptian campaign alienated many members of the English
academic community.13 The real blow to the unity of elite liberal intelligentsia, however,
would come in 1886. For now though, let us return to the life of James Bryce in the year 1870.
12 For academics in the Liberal Party generally, see Harvie, Lights of Liberalism 174-217.
13 See Dicey, A.V. “Why Do People Hate Mr. Gladstone?” The Nation Sept.14 1882. Xxxv.
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Portrait of Post-Civil War America
By 1870 James Bryce had cemented his academic reputation first won with his
publication of The Holy Roman Empire (1864) with several scholarly essays, served on an
education commission, become a practicing lawyer, and been appointed the Regius Chair of
Civil Law at Oxford.14 He was active in the Liberal Party (he could credit his Regius Chair
appointment to Gladstone) and a well-known proponent for reform in Britain, notably the
extension of franchise and the abolition of the Tests.
In August of that year he travelled to America for the first time with his lifelong
friend and fellow Oxonian Albert Dicey, the noted expert on British jurisprudence. On this
trip Bryce began to develop his wide array of American intellectual and political
correspondents which offers a window into the world of the transatlantic elite in the years
prior to and during the outbreak of war in Europe.
Most of Bryce’s American contacts were from north-eastern states and tended to be
educated at Harvard or Yale and other such institutions. Ions remarks that “the contacts
between men of letters and scholars in New England and in London, Oxford and Cambridge
in England were long established.”15 Many were Union veterans of the American Civil War,
most having been staunch abolitionists in the years and decades prior to the war. They
remembered Britain’s underhanded support of the Confederacy, but were gracious hosts to
14 For Holy Roman Empire and its reception, see Fisher, Vol. I 61-71. For Bryce’s service on the Taunton
Commission, see Ibid., 103-118. For his law practice and scholarly essays, see Ions 34-39.
15 Ions 45.
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visiting Britons, who (like Bryce and Dicey) tended to be of means as the journey and
accommodations were costly.16
The tension over the United Kingdom’s conduct during the Civil War was a
significant feature of Anglo-American relations at this time. Northerners and Southerners
alike tended to be irritated by the level of Britain’s involvement during the war. In 1870, this
tension had manifested itself in a controversy over the C.S.S. Alabama, the English-built
raider that so successfully frustrated Union merchant fleets during the war. By 1872 the issue
had been settled by arbitration, with Britain paying $15,500,000 to the United States.17 This
removed a significant impediment to the growth of friendlier relations between the two
countries.
From this first trip Bryce discovered the tremendous interconnectedness of New
England society. Dicey’s elder cousin Leslie Stephen (contributor to Essays on Reform and
father of Virginia Woolf) provided the travelling pair with some initial contacts which proved
to be quite helpful. The individuals the duo met on this trip, whether by prior arrangement or
chance, made for a rather memorable holiday. Dicey and Bryce smoked cigars with Henry
Wadsworth Longfellow in Maine, dined with the young Harvard law professor Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. (later in the trip they dined with the senior Holmes as well) and fellow
future United States Supreme Court Justice Horace Gray in Boston, and Bryce by himself
enjoyed the views of Mount Washington with Ralph Waldo Emerson. A keenly curious man,
16 English elites held significant Confederate sympathies, as they viewed Southern genteel society as similar to
their own.
17 Harold Allen, The Anglo-American Relationship Since 1783 (London: A. & C. Black Ltd., 1959) 218-220.
Also, Bingham, Thomas. “The Alabama Claims Arbitration,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 54
(2005): 1-25. On the subject of Anglo-American tension, Bryce recorded a conversation with North American
Review editor James Lowell, who “expect[ed] it [bitterness against Britain] to die out in the next generation.” As
discussed below, history did not fulfil this prophecy. Quoted in Ions 49.
19
Bryce meticulously documented his conversations in his journal, to which he would refer
later in his articles and books examining the nature of the American experiment.18
Bryce met an astonishingly diverse group of individuals on his journey: railroad
executives and shop owners, newspaper editors and university presidents, preachers and
lawyers from Boston to Chicago and back. Among these new friends (many of whom he
would correspond with for the remainder of his life) were experts in constitutional law,
education, and politics (Bryce and Dicey also found time to attend the 1870 New York
Democratic Party Convention in Rochester where they listened to a speech delivered by Boss
Tweed).19 Two further friendships worth mentioning are Charles Eliot, the young reform-
minded president of Harvard and Edwin Godkin, editor of The Nation. The former would
outlive Bryce, the latter predecease him. His correspondences with both were broken only by
death.20
Bryce’s keen eye discerned many differences and similarities between many levels of
British and American culture at this time. At the elite level with which this thesis is
concerned, both nations’ favoured sons received their university education (and, to a slightly
lesser extent in America, their secondary education) at a handful of favoured institutions.
Both were Anglo-Saxon in heritage and Christian in faith (and Protestant in denomination).
Promising young men of each nation often visited the other in the pursuit of knowledge and
the spirit of adventure.
Differences between the two groups of elites also abounded, Bryce noted. Socially
speaking, manners were less formal and more natural feeling in the United States,
18 Bryce’s diary of the journey is in the MS. Bryce Eng., 338. Various portions are missing, however.
19 MS. Bryce Eng., 338.75.
20 Ions 39-80.
20
conversations easier and more candid, which the young Scot preferred. Young American
women also enjoyed considerably more personal freedoms. Chaperones were less and less
common as parents increasingly viewed their daughters as mature enough to be in a man’s
company unattended and independent enough to choose their own husbands.21
While quite enthusiastic about much America had to offer, Bryce did make some
criticisms. Americans’ supreme belief in the efficacy of democracy and equality might have
dangerous implications, leading the country to confuse equality of opportunity with a form of
“equality of quality.” Nonetheless, “he fell in love with the United States” and might have
moved to America had ties of kinship not bound him to Britain.22
Bryce returned to England and continued his law practice, his academic writings, and
his duties as Regius Chair of Civil Law. In 1874 he ran for Parliament as a Liberal candidate
in Wick in northern Scotland. Letters from William Gladstone indicate Bryce’s chances of
success were limited.23 Bryce lost the election, but his interest in office did not subside. In
1880 he stood once again in the election, now as a Liberal candidate in Tower Hamlets in
East London. Victory did not elude him this time, and he soon began his 26-year career as a
Member of Parliament. He arrived at Westminster during a pivotal time for the British
Empire.
21 MS. Bryce Eng., 338.81.
22 Fisher, James Bryce Vol. I 61-71. See Ions 78 note 33 for desire to move to America.
23 See notes, William Gladstone to James Bryce, 2 January 1872, MS. Bryce Eng. 167.24.
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Imperial Federalism24
By the late nineteenth century, many in Britain felt that the empire’s global hegemony
was in real danger. Threatened by the surge in the power of nations such as Germany, Russia,
and the United States, Britain slowly and steadily felt a fear of decline creep into her national
consciousness. The Crimean War (1853-1856) had shaken public faith in the competency of
the military, after which concern continued to grow over the consolidation of nations on the
continent (e.g., Italy and Germany) and the general uncertainty of European affairs
(Napoleon III was a major source of anxiety). More and more Britons felt that the
maintenance of its empire was essential for sustaining the level of resources necessary to
uphold the nation’s supremacy in Europe:
[i]ncreasingly then, the decade after 1870 represented an
era of doubt… when old attitudes and assumptions were
seriously questioned for the first time… it was hardly
surprising that the Victorians began to exercise their
powers of introspection, and it was here that the empire
began to loom large in their minds as they wrestled with
the problem of how to adjust to a world which did not
promise guaranteed markets and international peace and
stability.25
But the intrinsic difficulties of administering a global empire in an age of delayed
communication had also been exerting more and more pressures on London – their effect
seemed cumulative. With every new far-flung dominion and every decade of distant
administration came unseen difficulties and more voices (though still vastly outnumbered)
24 Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 (Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2007), to which this portion of the work is indebted, provides an excellent analysis
of the issue of empire and federalism during this time.
25 Burgess, Michael. “The Imperial Federation Movement in Great Britain, 1869-1893,” PhD thesis, University
of Leicester 10.
22
stating that the empire was untenable.26 Much mid-Victorian wisdom suggested (and
accepted) the eventual, inevitable independence of the colonies.
The advent of steam-powered vessels and the trans-oceanic telegraph challenged this
wisdom and removed a central objection for the opponents of empire. Man was bending
nature to his will in the latter half of the nineteenth century, removing the barriers of distance
which had once stood in the way of progress and bringing the farthest parts of the globe
together. “Even [Edmund] Burke, to whom it also occurred as a reasonable political
conception, would have hesitated to employ the phrase, opposuit natura, with which he
dismissed it, could he have grasped the possibility of what steam and the telegraph have done
during the last half century.”27 With these technologies, the empire was more interconnected
and easily administrable than ever before.
While many persisted in their belief that the colonies should be cast off, an increasing
number believed the empire could be maintained in an altered form. Empowered by the
advantages of modern communication, a growing number of men favoured the
implementation of a federalist system. If messages could be relayed from Westminster to
New Delhi instantly, what was stopping the empire from operating in the same way a
contiguous nation could? This would have the effect of elevating colonial status and power –
the extent to which they would be elevated and the form of the new political system were
26 Goldwin Smith, mentor and long-time friend to James Bryce, was one of the most vocal of these voices.
Edward Freeman, Dicey, and Herbert Spencer were three more prominent opponents of federalism.
27 Parkin, George. Imperial Federation: the Problem of National Unity (London: Macmillan, 1892), 304. Burke,
an eighteenth century opponent of closer political union with the colonies, frequently cited the difficulties of
distance as justification for his position. See Bell, Duncan, 71-73.
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points of disagreement.28 The main motivation energizing the cause of imperial federalism,
however, was clear: the consolidation of military strength.29
The idea gained momentum during the 1870’s once the experiment of American
federalism had been tempered and strengthened in the fire of civil war. Canadian and German
experiments with federalism provided further examples of its efficacy. The movement
reached its crescendo in the 1880’s, as Bryce began his political career. It is no surprise that
the new Tower Hamlets M.P., the great admirer of America, supported these ideas, even
serving as the head of the Oxford chapter of the Imperial Federation League (interestingly,
his travelling companion Dicey was one of the staunchest opponents of British federalism).30
The large appeal and wide range of intellectual support which fuelled the movement
for some form of imperial federalism eventually proved to be as much an impediment to
federalism’s cause as it was an advantage. Ideological and theoretical inconsistency among
the proponents of imperial federalists made the transition from abstract rhetoric to practical,
implementable proposals unfeasible. Burgess cautiously identifies no less than four distinct
groups within the Imperial Federation League alone who all disagreed about the best way to
achieve the group’s objectives.31 Opposition to their cause by politicians like Gladstone and
Salisbury and scholars like Dicey and Edward Freeman, as well as virtually everyone in the
Colonial Office, also took its toll, as well as internal disagreement over Irish Home Rule
which significantly contributed to the decline in influence of imperial federalists by the end
of the nineteenth century. Rather than the realization of grandiose plans for institutional
28 See Burgess, Michael. The British Tradition of Federalism (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 1995) 23-
50.
29 Bell, Duncan, 18.
30 Burgess provides an excellent examination of the Imperial Federation League in “The Imperial Federation
Movement in Great Britain, 1869-1893.”
31 Ibid., 250-253.
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change, imperial federalism’s contributions would come in the form of colonial conferences
and more minor economic alterations.
It is important, however, to note that British society, especially the intellectual
quarter, was beginning to observe American phenomena and theorize about their implications
in the United Kingdom much more openly after the American Civil War. The flow of idea
exchange at the elite level could once again resume after 1865, now more vigorously than
before. The war had confirmed the viability and durability of the young country and its
institutions, allowing it to be more seriously considered by Britain. The historical, cultural,
and “racial” ties of the two nations (all emphasized by Bryce) greatly eased this exchange.
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Anglo-Saxonism and Transatlantic Elite Racial Unity
Another notion quickly developing at this time in aide of and in concert with ideas
about British federalism was an increasingly widespread belief in the unity and innate
superiority of the Anglo-Saxon “race.”32 This resurgent Anglo-Saxonism was mutable, taking
many forms and serving many purposes. It is necessary, therefore, to trace parts of the term’s
evolution and usage in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in order to
determine its significance in the development of the Special Relationship.
Paul Kramer identifies two authors as important early proponents of Anglo-Saxonism
common to both sides of the Atlantic: Charles Dilke and future president Theodore
Roosevelt.33 Dilke’s 1868 book, Greater Britain: a Record of Travel in English-speaking
Countries, begins with his journey through and musings about the United States. Throughout
his account on America, Dilke emphatically asserts the Englishness of the American people,
in their blood, in their customs, and especially in their institutions: “…the true moral of
America is the vigour of the English race.”34 The future M.P. and Cabinet Minister
maintained the Anglican Church in America was growing rapidly and the expansion of the
alien Catholic Church stalling, further confirming the United States’ Englishness.35
Perhaps most importantly for Dilke, American institutions were transforming the sons
of Irishmen, Germans, Norwegians, and Frenchmen into Englishmen: “America is becoming,
32 E.g.: “British people in all parts of the Empire should have…full and equal privileges of self-government and
citizenship. The political instinct which works in this direction nothing can resist, for it has become innate in all
that is best in our race.” Parkin, George. Imperial Federation: the Problem of National Unity (1892), 31.
Accessed via http://anglosphere.com/weblog/archives/ebooks/1892_impfed_20050519.doc
33 Kramer, Paul. “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States
Empires, 1880-1910,” The Journal of American History, 88 (2002): 1315-1353.
34 Dilke, Charles. Greater Britain, A Record of Travel in English-speaking Countries (London: Macmillan,
1894) 308.
35 Ibid., 314.
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not English merely, but world-embracing… America offers the English race the moral
directorship of the globe, by ruling mankind through Saxon institutions and the English
tongue. Through America, England is speaking to the world.”36 Dilke’s theory of Anglo-
Saxonism, therefore, is both highly racialised and inclusive at the same time. By stating that
Irishmen and Frenchmen were “becoming English,” Dilke asserted the importance of the
non-racial elements of Anglo-Saxonism – that is, Anglo-Saxon culture and (even more so)
institutions.
For Dilke then, transoceanic Anglo-Saxonism operated at racial, cultural, and
institutional levels – allowing England to share in American successes and binding her to her
lost colony. Furthermore, the unity of the Anglo-Saxon race across the globe, which Dilke
documented in the rest of his book, served to reinforce cohesion of the entire empire.
Kramer’s identification of Roosevelt as a prime example of American intellectual
Anglo-Saxonism is more problematic, however, for identifying some of its earlier forms. The
younger Theodore Roosevelt had received his education in an environment already charged
with “a romantic Anglo-Saxonism.”37 His earlier scholastic efforts “depended… upon
acceptance of the ideology of white racial destiny and supremacy,” specifically the primacy
of “the English-speaking peoples.”38 John Higham is closer to the mark, identifying two
authors nearer to the origins of American Anglo-Saxonism: John Fiske and Dexter Arnold
Hawkins.39
36 Ibid., 318.
37 Dyer, Thomas. Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1992) 5.
38 Ibid., 9. Roosevelt, Theodore. The Winning of the West, vol. I. In The Works of Theodore Roosevelt: vol. VIII
(New York: Hastings House, 1963) 3-22.
39 Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum,
1963) 338.
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Hawkins’ 1875 address entitled “The Anglo-Saxon Race: its History, Character, and
Destiny” described the Anglo-Saxon race as “distinguished for its energy, activity, love of
individual liberty and of national independence,” with America perhaps “its most promising
and vigorous representative.”40 Hawkins passionately maintained “if the race be true to itself,
if it fulfils the high destiny which the Divine hand seems to have marked out for it,
then…future races will look back upon its period as the brightest in human history.”41 For
Hawkins then, Anglo-Saxons (who were also physically and intellectually blessed) were a
chosen people, called to usher in the world’s greatest era.
Fiske’s American Political Ideals challenged the use of the term Anglo-Saxon, a
distinction important to many Americans. Instead, Fiske joined Edward Freeman in rejecting
this term as ambiguous, instead choosing to use, simply, “the English race” (a moniker which
surely irritated many of those who rejected the term Anglo-Saxon for different reasons).42 He
agreed with Hawkins and Dilke in his identification of America as fundamentally English,
dismissing other heritages and cultures by asserting that the “[the English race] has shown a
rare capacity for absorbing slightly foreign elements and moulding them into conformity with
a political type that was first wrought out through centuries of effort on British soil.”43 The
grand destiny of the English race reverberates throughout Fiske’s writings.
Anderson points out racial theories were commonplace among the world’s great
powers during the late nineteenth century. German, French, and Russian thinkers also
40 Hawkins, Dexter. “The Anglo-Saxon Race: its History, Character, and Destiny,” 4. Address given before
Syracuse University, 21-6-1875. Accessed via
http://ia600301.us.archive.org/24/items/anglosaxonracei00hawkgoog/anglosaxonracei00hawkgoog.pdf on
17/3/11 at 16:29 GMT.
41 Ibid., 28.
42 Fiske, John. “American Political Ideas: Viewed from the Standpoint of Universal History,” 75. Accessed via
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=stVp4OQJY80C&pg=PA74&dq=john+fiske+anglo-
saxon&hl=en&ei=UPyBTZ2TCMKGhQfjzKC0BA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDk
Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false on 18/3/11 at 10:44 GMT.
43 Ibid., 76.
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developed scientifically specious cosmogenies that advocated expansion, asserted the
importance of racial unity across national boundaries, and emphasised racial superiority.44
Additionally, the imprecise and variegated articulations of “race-thinking” made theories
attractable to a wide range of adherents. Pliability was an advantage: “it allowed those who
believed in the primacy of race in the development of human societies to adjust their
definitions of racial terms to fit almost any circumstance.”45 In this way, earlier, more
explicitly racial expositions of Anglo-Saxonism could be gradually altered in response to
changes in the political or social landscapes.
One of the most famous literary expressions of the sense of Anglo-Saxons’ duty to
bring the light of civilization to the dark corners of the world is Rudyard Kipling’s 1899
poem “The White Man’s Burden.” In it, Kipling urged America forward in its war against
Spain and the subsequent rebellion in the Philippines (see below for a further discussion of
the Spanish-American War). Its first verse deftly encapsulates racial Anglo-Saxonism’s
civilizing mission:
Take up the White Man's burden--
Send forth the best ye breed--
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild--
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.46
44 Anderson, Stuart. Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904
(London: Associated University Press, 1981) 17-18.
45 Ibid., 18. Anderson also makes an important point about the term “race” and its usage by racial theorists:
“Race, a term of biological science, and nation, a term in the social sciences, were often used synonymously.”
Ibid., 18-20.
46 Kipling, Rudyard. “The White Man’s Burden.” McClure’s Magazine 12 (1899). Accessed via
http://mrmanos.com/documents/WhiteMansBurden.pdf on 25/3/11 at 12:24 GMT.
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The poem received praise from many, including Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, a powerful future Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Many others
mocked the poem for its racist, condescending imperialism. While the poem may have had
little practical impact in the development of American imperialism, the large amount of
attention it received (and continues to receive) indicates its significant resonance (and
dissonance).47
Considerable resistance to the idea of America as Anglo-Saxon in character existed at
all levels. Certainly, the large numbers of Irish, Scandinavian, German, and other Americans
of non-British extraction did not enthuse over notions that their country was fundamentally
English in character and culture. John Fleming contemptuously described the English
proponents of Anglo-Saxonism such as Dilke, Edward Freeman, and Goldwin Smith as men
who “see that the day is surely coming when England will have to take her place behind the
American republic” and who were scrambling to attach themselves by any means necessary
to world’s next great power.48 By and large, however, resistance to Anglo-Saxonism resided
in the immigrant and rural populations.
The most clearly visible and possibly the best-known font of anti-British sentiment
sprang from the vast numbers of Irish-Americans and Irish immigrants. 4.1 million Irish men
and women arrived in America from 1820 to 1920, with 200,000 to 300,000 present before
that time, constituting a significant voting bloc in and of itself.49 Furthermore, the expansion
47 For a good analysis of the poem’s initial reception and continued reinterpretations, see Brantlinger, Patrick.
“Kipling’s ‘The White Man’s Burden’ and Its Afterlives,” English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920 50
(2007): 172-191.
48 Fleming, John. “Are We Anglo-Saxons?” The North American Review 153 (1891): 253-254.
49 Hout, Michael and Goldstein, Joshua. “How 4.5 Million Irish Immigrants Became 40 Million Irish
Americans: Demographic and Subjective Aspects of the Ethnic Composition of White Americans.” American
Sociological Review 59 (1994): 65.
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of the numbers of those identifying as Irish-Americans “exceed[ed] what natural increase
would imply.”50
Ireland itself was at the forefront of British attention at this time. The defeat of
Gladstone’s Home Rule efforts in 1886 by just 16 votes was the cause of immense anger
among Irish-Americans. Edwin Godkin remarked to Bryce about the intense interest,
unprecedented in his considerable experience, which marked American observation of the
debate and vote.51 Irish-Americans in the latter nineteenth century were most concentrated in
the urban Northeast, frequently serving as an effective electoral counterweight to the
Anglophile elites also living in the region.
Three further sources of Anglophobia are the absence of any other significant
traditional rival, an element of jealousy toward Britain’s global hegemony, and a resentment
of British capital and influence in the South and the West. During rowdy Fourth of July
celebrations boisterous Americans often berated England for want of any other adversary, as
Rudyard Kipling once observed with some unease.52 Some during the same celebration
decried (almost covetously) “her chain of fortresses across the world.”53 During the
Venezuela Affair (discussed below), Andrew Carnegie thought the nation of his birth
“unreasonably greedy not to leave the United States one continent to manage.”54 A
combination of traditional rivalry and envy existed at this time in America that provided
50 Ibid., 64.
51 Godkin to Bryce, 28 May 1886. Quoted in Ions, 150. MS. Bryce USA, 5.50.
52 Kipling, Rudyard. American Notes (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1981) 44-45.
53 Ibid., 44.
54 Perkins, P. The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (New York: Atheneum,
1968) 17.
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another stumbling block to the advancement of warmer Anglo-American relations.55 Charles
Dilke earlier posited that this jealousy in fact masked closeness:
[America] still yearns towards our kindly friendship. A
Napoleonic senator harangues, a French paper
declaims…who cares? But a Times’ leader, or a speech in
Parliament from a minister of the Crown, cuts to the heart,
wounding terribly…there must be love at bottom for even
querulousness to arise.56
Finally, the presence of significant amounts of British capital in the Western and Midwestern
United States as well as the influence of Britain on the prices of cotton, corn, and wheat
fuelled Anglophobia in the South and west of the Mississippi River. More generally, “a direct
correlation existed between the level of economic development of a region and the intensity
of anti-British sentiment.”57 Thus, while not entirely absent from elites, Anglophobic
feelings tended to reside more in the general population.
At the elite level in America, acceptance of Anglo-Saxon solidarity was more
widespread for a number of reasons. These individuals often journeyed to Britain or hosted
travelling Britons, offering them greater exposure to Britons and their culture. High-profile
Anglo-American marriages were also prominent during this period, with wealthy American
heiresses often wedding pecuniarily-challenged British nobles. Perkins calculates that “some
seventy marriages took place before 1903, perhaps another sixty by 1914, almost all
involving financial settlements.”58 Personal friendships and the ties of matrimony augmented
transatlantic goodwill in both countries.
55 Dilke notes an American jealousy in 1866. Dilke, vol. I, 304. See also, Crapol, Edward. America for
Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia in the Late Nineteenth Century (Westport, CT:
Greenwood, 1973) 68, 222.
56 Dilke, 305.
57 Crapol, 222.
58 Perkins, 151.
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Furthermore, tensions against immigrant groups were frequently present among more
established Americans, who sought to distinguish themselves from the unwashed, huddled
masses pouring into the United States. In the 1870’s and 1880’s, established elites
distinguished themselves from both common rabble and the nouveau riche by asserting their
English racial heritage; thus, “Anglo-Saxonism became a kind of patrician nationalism.”59 In
fact, Dilke’s Greater Britain “had more buyers in the United States than at home, probably
because it said so much that Americans wanted to believe.”60
Thus, significant development of racial, cultural, and institutional Anglo-Saxonism
occurred at the elite levels of both countries. Kramer neatly states that “the success of Anglo-
Saxonism as a racial-exceptionist bridge between the United States and the British Empire
was due in part to the social, familial, intellectual, and literary networks that tied elite
Americans and Britons together.”61 The establishment of these networks was eased by the
myriad similarities between the elites of both nations, as Bryce had observed during his 1870
journey to the United States.
It is important to note here that the development of theories concerning Anglo-Saxon
unity of race, culture, and institutions occurred more in Britain than the United States.
Increasingly isolated in world affairs, concerned with maintaining its empire, and cognizant
of the impending ascendancy of the America to the world stage, the United Kingdom was in a
59 Higham 32.
60 May, Ernest. American Imperialism: a Speculative Essay (New York: Atheneum, 1968) 119.
61 Kramer, Paul. “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 1326. For Kramer, the more significant
development of transatlantic Anglo-Saxonism occurred with the intersections of American and British
merchants, tourists, administrators, military officers, and missionaries across the globe outside of either’s home
nation, as well as the simultaneous alignment of colonial interests after the Spanish-American War of 1898. In
the presence of completely alien cultures, Americans and Britons could more easily see their myriad
resemblances. See Ibid., 1327-1335.
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much more anxious, reflective frame of mind. The various forms of Anglo-Saxonism
provided a bulwark against the fears of decline penetrating the national consciousness.
The burgeoning transatlantic Anglo-Saxonism and the accompanying rapprochement
between Britain and America did not go unnoticed by the world. In France, a small number of
highly influential thinkers theorized about the commonalities of English and American
societies. They tended to avoid any flawed racial considerations in favour of consideration of
social issues such as “individualism, industrialism, and education,” making Anglo-Saxonism
a “crystallization of a range of values and social perceptions within a simple symbolic
form.”62 Alan Pitt identifies three areas of strength in which the French perceived American
and British society to be analogous: “the relative importance of the private life of the
family…an instinctive grasp of reality…and a sense that both England and America were
‘self-governing’.”63
Germans were, of course, involved in the very foundation of the Anglo-Saxon racial
cosmogeny. Justus Möser’s and Johann Gottfried von Herder’s writings in the late 1700’s
contained praise for Anglo-Saxons who were really wayward Germans.64 The Teutonic
origins of Anglo-Saxons prompted some to attempt to include Germany as a “blood brother
of Britain” and the United States. Alfred T. Mahan, the noted American naval strategist,
briefly called for Anglo-Germanic-American cooperation against Slavic aggression in a
relationship “founded upon the rock of common interest, and cemented by the ties of
62 Pitt, Alan. “A Changing Anglo-Saxon Myth: Its Development and Function in French Political Thought,
1860-1914.”French History 14 (2000): 154.
63 Ibid., 173.
64 See Horsman, Reginald. Race and Manifest Destiny: the Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1981) 25-30.
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blood.”65 Such attempts at racial inclusion were rare, however, and did not have significant
effect.
Having recognized that there are inherent limitations to concise definitions of the
complex term “Anglo-Saxonism,” it is nonetheless helpful to restate some of its main tenets.
While recognizing the racial superiority of the Teutonic-descended denizens of Britain and
her children abroad, it also held that the Anglo-Saxon nations possessed humanity’s greatest
institutions, unmatched capacities for self-government and administration (a burden which
called them to the cause of civilising the barbaric world), and a vigorous, masculine,
Protestant ethos which empowered them in their natural pursuit of empire. This lashed the
British Empire and the United States together on a rough, increasingly uncertain sea among
consolidated young nations eager for empires of their own.
65 Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Problem of Asia and its Effects upon International Policies, 133. Quoted in
Bönker, Dirk. “Admiration, Enmity, and Cooperation: U.S. Navalism and the British and German Empires
before the Great War.” Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 2 (2001): 17. Accessed via
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_colonialism_and_colonial_history/v002/2.1bonker.html on 21/3/11 at
15:12 GMT.
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Social Darwinism: Its Place within Federalism and Anglo-Saxonism
Another theory popular at the end of the nineteenth century which greatly influenced
the intellectual community and the development of the Special Relationship was social
Darwinism. Most scholars and elites in the period believed in the theory in some form or
another – as with Anglo-Saxonism, it is an elusive term. The many forms and evolving nature
of social Darwinism are briefly summarized by Robert Bannister:
To Achille Loria and Emile de Laveleye, two distinguished
European sociologists, Darwinisme sociale meant brutal
individualism, such as Herbert Spencer advocated. For others it
was a new rationale for socialism and the class struggle. In the
1890s, the Russian-born pacifist Jacques Novicow used le
Darwinisme social to describe a rising tide of imperialist and
militarist sentiment… [I]n 1906… [it had] yet another meaning
– eugenics.66
The chief name associated today with social Darwinism in Britain during this time is Herbert
Spencer, born in 1820. The popularity of this theory was not limited to Europe and Britain,
however. In fact, Spencer’s book (as with Dilke’s) arguably enjoyed more success in
America than in Britain: “It was impossible to be active in any field of intellectual work in
the three decades after the Civil War without mastering Spencer.”67
Spencer’s moral philosophy sought “to join in one coherent structure the latest
contributions of physics and biology” and apply this to society.68 Independently of (and prior
to) Darwin, Spencer postulated that scarcity of resources had pruned the tree of humanity,
casting off the slow or unintelligent while rewarding ingenuity: a process he called “the
66 Bannister, Robert. Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought (Philadelphia,
Temple University Press, 1979) 4.
67 Hofstadter, Richard. Social Darwinism in American Thought: 1860-1915 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania, 1944) 20.
68 Ibid., 22.
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survival of the fittest.”69 Spencer also included in his books an assertion of the existence of
the “Unknowable,” a realm in which religion resided.
Foremost among Spencer’s many American adherents was Yale professor William
Graham Sumner, born in 1840. His philosophy drew heavily from Spencer, arguing that
competition within human society propelled the most able men to affluence. This was not a
zero-sum system, however, where one man’s wealth meant another’s poverty; rather, society
afforded every man equal opportunity. And this model was applicable to the community of
nations. The allure of Spencer and Sumner to elites in both America and the United Kingdom
is clear: their beliefs validated their personal economic status and their nations’ global
prestige. As May states, “certain courses of action could not be rationalised by reference to
Manifest Destiny of Mission or need for new markets, but almost any course could be
justified as part of a ‘struggle for survival.’”70
To summarise, fundamental portions of this theory relevant to this thesis maintain
that, through competition and adjustment, individuals, governments, and institutions adapt or
perish as a result of the pursuit of resources. Bryce himself employed this method in his
scholarship, notably in The American Commonwealth discussed below.
Social Darwinism could be interpreted to mean the relative positions of power of the
world’s races came to reflect their inborn characteristics. Hence, the supremacy of the British
Empire reflected the inherent intelligence, organizational ability, and talent for self-
government that the Anglo-Saxon race possessed in quantities greater than any other ethnic
group.
69 Ibid., 26. Quoting “A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility.” Westminster
Review, LVII (1852): 499-500.
70 May, Ernest 227-228.
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The application of social Darwinism to Anglo-Saxonism reinforced the theory by
lending it scientific credibility. Rooted in questionable history and the rise of racialised
nationalism, Anglo-Saxonism took on an added heir of intellectual respectability with this
infusion, breathing new life into a theory that might have otherwise not survived long enough
to have any significant impact on the men of the Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham
House.
And by applying the tenets of social Darwinism to the entire Anglo-Saxon race rather
than the United Kingdom or the empire alone, those looking to bind the empire together more
closely had laid another important foundation. Anglo-Saxon unity could also be extended to
Britannia’s runaway, the United States. The perceived closeness of American and British
heritage, thought, and abilities, as well as their sense of duty in a global civilizing mission,
formed an important part of the bedrock of the Special Relationship. As shown below, elites
of both countries at the time of the Great War felt a keen kinship to their cousins on the other
side of the Atlantic.
The three phenomena examined in this chapter relate to each other in important ways
that impacted the environments that produced the young generation of Versailles. Social
Darwinism and the various forms of racial Anglo-Saxonism together contributed to an
increased emphasis among the transatlantic elite on common culture, institutions, ancestry,
and destiny. These trends augmented the momentum of the federalist movement in Britain –
which constituted a significant step forward in the warming of Anglo-American relations, as
imperial federalists frequently upheld the United States as an example of robust federalism.
Keeping these developments in mind, we may now return to the American travels of
James Bryce.
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Bryce’s 1881, 1883 Visits to America71
In August of 1881, Bryce again visited United States, this time alone and with a yen
for the American West. He had by this time gained not a meagre amount of fame in America,
as the author of The Holy Roman Empire, a Member of Parliament, and a noted legal expert.
Having visited old friends like Godkin (he had been regularly contributing to The Nation on a
wide range of subjects, further augmenting his renown) and Holmes, Bryce struck out for
Denver. During this four-month odyssey the new Member of Parliament visited Denver, Salt
Lake City, San Francisco, Seattle, Vancouver, Santa Fe, St. Louis, Atlanta, Richmond, and
Washington, D.C, among other cities and towns. His second trip was no less astounding than
the first in terms of its breadth and the persons Bryce met and interviewed – notably John
Taylor (head of the Mormon Church), President Chester A. Arthur, and Henry Adams. He
returned home having once again significantly expanded his list of friends knowledgeable
about all manner of American affairs.
In 1883 Bryce received an invitation from his friend Henry Villard, a railroad
financier, to be among the honoured guests of the inauguration of the Northern Pacific
Railroad. The cars of this first run were rife with luminaries – among them Ulysses Grant and
Joseph Pulitzer. Naturally Bryce made the most of his time onboard a confined space with
noted politicians, diplomats and publishers, once again enlarging his remarkable network of
correspondents. After an expedition to Mount Tacoma, he again explored the American West.
He also made time to visit Hawaii and observe the volcano Kilauea.
71 For these visits, see Bryce Papers, MSS. Bryce 338, 334-340.
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Returning to the east coast later that year, Bryce conducted a graduate seminar at John
Hopkins University on Alexis de Tocqueville’s American Democracy. Among his students
was a young Thomas Woodrow Wilson (also a Presbyterian), who held a keen admiration for
Bryce – the two developed a friendship that, like so many of Bryce’s associations, would
only be sundered by death.
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Home Rule Split of 1886
The United Kingdom’s general election of 1885 failed to produce a majority for either
the Liberals or the Conservatives. As a result, Charles Parnell and the Irish Home Rule
Party’s 86 seats held the balance of power. Parnell joined Gladstone to form a coalition
government, whose main charge was bringing forth a bill to grant Ireland some form of
Home Rule.
Candidates in Britain had largely ignored the Irish Question. The hung parliament
which the election produced, and the subsequent coalition, meant that the new government
would be handling an issue “not fully ventilated in the election.”72 This placed Gladstone in a
precarious position, as his party was already showing signs of fissure. Furthermore, despite
the apparent victory for Parnellites in managing to bring Home Rule to the forefront,
ambushing an unsuspecting public and an unprepared Parliament with an ultimatum to decide
an explosive issue was a less than ideal method to achieve their ends. Adept at obstruction,
Parnell’s party could no longer be ignored. Gladstone’s government appeared almost doomed
from the start.
While issues of constitutionality had been ignored in 1867 with the publication of
Essays on Reform, Irish Home Rule thrust them into prominence. Two of the leading
academics at the forefront of this constitutional debate (on opposite sides) were none other
than Albert Dicey and James Bryce. Dicey’s recently published Introduction to the Study of
the Law of the Constitution secured his reputation as a leading legal expert with near-
72 Lubenow, W.C. Parliamentary Politics and the Home Rule Crisis: the British House of Commons in 1886
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988) 37.
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universal respect. For Dicey (who was not unsympathetic to Irish nationalism), Home Rule
required “a change in the Constitution so fundamental as to amount to a legal and pacific
revolution.”73 His opposition to the bill, therefore, resided primarily in these constitutional
objections. 74
Bryce could not mount a convincing response to Dicey, soon finding himself isolated
from his academic contemporaries. His position as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs
demanded greater measures of party loyalty and pragmatism – he did not have the liberty to
engage in unencumbered theoretical debate. “His lonely, pessimistic, constitutionally illogical
support for Gladstone’s policy retained him the respect of his academic critics, but scarcely
inspired conviction.”75 Nonetheless, his prominent role in the Home Rule debate ultimately
enhanced his prestige as a “leading” Liberal.
More than any other factors, the bill itself and the internal instability of the Liberal
Party led to the defeat of Home Rule. With the defection of 94 Liberal M.P.’s, the Irish Home
Rule Bill failed to pass on 8 June, 1886. Following the collapse of the government, the
breakaway Liberal Unionist Party secured 77 seats in the July election, forming a coalition
government with the Conservatives.
For academic Liberals, 1886 marked a continuation of their migration away from
political involvement.76 The enthusiasm for practical politics present in the 1868 elections
had waned – just as academic influence in Westminster was at its height. In reality, though,
73 Dicey, Albert Venn. England’s Case Against Home Rule, 278. Accessed via
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14886/14886-h/14886-h.htm#CHAPTER_VIII on 23/3/11 at 15:15 GMT.
74 For a worthwhile examination of these men’s friendship in the midst of disagreement, see Harvie,
Christopher, “Ideology and Home rule: James Bryce, A.V. Dicey and Ireland, 1880-1887.” The English
Historical Review, 91 (1976) 298-314.
75 Harvie, Christopher. “Ideology and Home Rule,” 312.
76 See Ibid., 314. Also, Harvie, Christopher. Lights of Liberalism, 219 ff. Seaman notes that “the first Home
Rule crisis, too, by transforming intellectual disagreement into political schism, weakened the ties that bound
intellectuals to active politics.” Seaman 118.
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the elite Liberal intelligentsia had not ever garnered the attention, power, and unity in
Parliament necessary to effect the changes it felt were necessary for the health of the empire,
be it the implementation of some form of federalism or the curb of imperialism. Division
within its own ranks further weakened the academics’ influence and motivation.
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Liberal Academic Elites in the Late Nineteenth Century: their Politics and their
Influence as Teachers on the Versailles Generation
The influence of James Bryce on Woodrow Wilson raises an interesting area of
consideration – namely, what was the extent of the influence of Bryce’s generation of Liberal
academics on subsequent generations, especially the younger men of Versailles who banded
together to form the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute for International
Affairs? The reaction of these young men against their elders who deprived them of what
they believed to be their due influence and ignored their opinions is not entirely unlike the
struggle against the Tests some fifty years prior.
Many men who contributed to Essays on Reform and Questions for a Reformed
Parliament became university professors. James Bryce was an Oriel College Fellow and the
Regius Chair of Civil Law who lectured at scores of universities in both Britain and America.
A.V. Dicey became the Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford and an established
constitutional expert. Goldwin Smith taught at Cornell University in America. Charles
Brodrick became the Warden of Merton College, Oxford. Charles Pearson became a Fellow
of Trinity, Cambridge.
At first glance then, it appears that the Liberal intelligentsia may indeed have had
considerable influence on pre- and (to a lesser extent) inter-war elites as their university
professors. Further reflection, however, presents a number of problems. First, as the Home
Rule split of 1886 shows, liberal academic thought was by no means homogenous. Secondly,
university life and British society in general were in the throes of change during the late
nineteenth century, change that often made the Liberal academics of Bryce’s generation feel
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isolated. The front benches of Parliament in the early 1900’s, largely Oxford and Cambridge
men, “showed little evidence of having been influenced by academic liberalism.”77
Nonetheless, these men had played a key role in the abolition of the Tests, and thus
had influence on the very structure of higher education in Britain. Furthermore, the myriad
personal relationships that men like Bryce and Dicey developed with leading figures of both
the United States and the United Kingdom gave this group valuable personal influence with
prominent figures such as presidents, Prime Ministers, senators, Members of Parliament, and
publishers. They also produced authoritative books in a broad range of fields, in addition to
countless articles and speeches. The ideologies and political influence of this intellectual
generation might have been in retreat – their respect and personal influence were not.
77 See Harvie, Lights of Liberalism 198.
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Magnum Opus: The American Commonwealth
By this time Bryce had begun to seriously consider attempting a major book that
would examine American institutions, law, and life at the federal, state, and local levels.
Taking advantage of the greater amounts of free time afforded to member of the opposition in
1887 and 1888, Bryce drew on his own extensive knowledge of the United States,
supplementing this considerable resource by utilizing his network of diverse expert
correspondents to create another profoundly influential book.
In its breadth of subject and depth of analysis, the two-volume The American
Commonwealth had no match prior to its 1888 publication. It was an academic tour de force,
deftly employing comparative method to yield a book of exquisite observation and keen
analysis. It examined the U.S. and Confederate Constitutions, the function and interactions of
the branches of government, all 38 state constitutions and the working of their governments,
the courts, municipal governments, and the party system (“[N]o one before him, not even
Americans, had made a comprehensive study of America’s all-important party system). 78
Its reception on both sides of the Atlantic was overwhelmingly positive. It was
“invaluable because of its fulness [sic], its accuracy, its candor, its sane, perhaps I ought
rather to say its sage, balance of practical judgment,” observed Woodrow Wilson.79 The force
of Bryce’s book made it “not merely an event in the annals of literature. It was a political
landmark.”80 The book made Bryce “universally considered…the most perceptive and among
78 Tulloch, Hugh. James Bryce’s American Commonwealth: the Anglo-American Background (Woodbridge,
Suffolk: Boydell, 1988) 8.
79 Wilson, Woodrow. “Bryce’s American Commonwealth,” Political Science Quarterly 4 (1889): 154.
80 Fisher, Vol. II, 233.
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the most friendly foreign observers of the United States.”81 Scholastically speaking, “its
citation was obligatory and deference to its author a necessary formal requirement for anyone
following in his [Bryce’s] path.”82 If a minor celebrity in America’s intellectual quarters
before the Commonwealth’s publication, Bryce became one of the most well-known Britons
in the United States with its publication.83
81 Perkins 276.
82 Tulloch 188.
83 The author cannot help but to make mention of the highly specious, polemical article by Graham Maddox, an
article bent on exposing Bryce as having “an underlying purpose to demonstrate the unmatched sagacity
displayed in English and British political experience” (Maddox, Graham. “James Bryce: Englishness and
Federalism in America and Australia.” Publius 34 (2004): 68).
Maddox applies modern standards of racial tolerance in his attacks on Bryce (whose views on race
were hardly the worst of his era – indeed, his friend Booker T. Washington and an audience at a speech he
delivered to the Tuskegee Institute would have thought them comparatively forward-thinking; see ibid., 65-69).
He also fails to consider the environment of rapprochement in which Bryce wrote The American Commonwealth
– Maddox sees Bryce as claiming credit for the U.S. Constitution for Britain, ignoring Bryce’s lifelong
commitment to improving Anglo-American relations and the possibility that Bryce was attempting to highlight
the similarities of the two nations in pursuit of this goal.
Finally, Maddox labels Bryce a “social Darwinist” interpreter of politics, enlisting the support of John
Wright and Hugh Tulloch in this claim without properly considering the term and its complexities (see ibid.,
56). Closer inspection of these two sources, reveal that both authors describe his methods as
“Darwinian…implying that environmental conditions had controlled both the intellectual and political
development of American government” and as a Darwinian scholar who “insisted upon treating human
institution in terms of challenge and response to a specific and changing environment” (Wright, John.
“Anglicizing the United States Constitution: James Bryce’s Contribution to Australian Federalism.” Publius 31
(2001): 110. Also, Tulloch 62). As discussion above indicates, the academic vagueness of the term and the wide
range of intellectual sins it covers demands explicit exposition, which Wright and Tulloch take care to do.
Maddox fails to do this, using the term “social Darwinist” without establishing its context.
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Popular American Anglophobia and British Courtship of the United States
Although elites of both countries were gradually warming to one another in the
closing years of the nineteenth century, consideration of a few important events shows that
relations between the two nations were not without tension, nor their denizens without old
prejudices. It is important to consider these cases in order to determine each country’s
evolving sentiments toward the other, both among elites and policymakers as well as the
general population.
The presidential election of 1888 exposed such tensions, revealing the powerful
Anglophobic sentiment still present in the United States. Incumbent Democratic President
Grover Cleveland was running a tight race against Republican Benjamin Harrison. Because
he was a proponent of lower tariffs and possessed a more generally friendly attitude toward
the United Kingdom, British observers both at home and in America by and large supported
Cleveland and the Democrats. Conscious of Anglophobia, the British government and its
more prudent citizens kept this backing quiet.
In an effort to expose this, W.F. Fitzgerald of the California Republican State
Executive Committee set out to dupe the British Envoy to America, Sir Lionel Sackville-
West, into putting British support of Cleveland into writing. In a letter purporting to be a
naturalised Englishman in need of advice from his mother country’s representative,
Fitzgerald solicited voting advice from Sackville-West. The envoy, in a considerable lapse in
judgment, wrote to “Mr. Charles Murchison” and advised that he support Cleveland and the
Democrats (ironically, his letter shows an awareness of the situation’s delicacy, stating “any
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political party which openly favoured the mother-country at the present moment would lose
popularity”).84
The letter was quickly published in a New York Republican newspaper and reprinted
on Election Day. The New York Irish-American voters did not respond favourably to this
accidental endorsement, helping to deliver their state and the presidency to Harrison (New
York’s 36 electoral votes were the margin of difference). While transatlantic relations may
have been warming at the elite level, many other groups retained a deep distrust of Great
Britain.
A diplomatic imbroglio in South America arose in 1895 that provides an opportunity
to consider the manner in which the Great Britain and the United States resolved their
disagreements. At this time, Venezuela had long been laying claim to significant portions of
western British Guyana. In 1895, Venezuelan advocates discovered a way of drawing the
United States into the struggle – by invoking the sacred Monroe Doctrine.85
Congress, moved to action by an increasingly aggravated American public, quickly
urged arbitration. President Cleveland (who came back to defeat Harrison in 1892) sent a
letter to the British government asserting U.S. dominance in the entire region and extending
the Monroe Doctrine to the dispute in question. More than four months passed before Lord
Salisbury’s government, unaware of the extent of American resolve and ire, replied with a
strong rejection of the Monroe Doctrine’s application and basic legitimacy. Cleveland
84 Quoted in Mowat, R.B. The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States (New York:
Longmans, Green &, 1925) 243. See ibid., 240-246 for the Sackville-West incident generally.
85 Mead makes a significant observation concerning the Monroe Doctrine and its role in the United States’
foreign policy: “The Monroe Doctrine was not only not isolationist, it was anti-isolationist. It amounted to the
recognition that American safety depended on the balance of power in Europe.” Mead, Walter Russell. Special
Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Knopf, 2001) 81. The
balance of power, of course, was one in which Britain dominated, especially at sea. The Monroe Doctrine,
despite being used in this instance as a justification of intervention against the United Kingdom, was actually a
tacit acknowledgment of America’s dependence on the “wooden walls” of the British Empire.
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responded by establishing a committee to investigate Venezuela’s claims and promising that
its decision would be implemented, by force if necessary. A popular bellow for war began to
resound in United States.
Britain was caught off guard by this bellicosity. An exasperated Bryce wrote to his
friend Henry Villard: “[W]e are astonished at all this fury, especially over a trumpery
question which not one man in ten even in the House of Commons has heard of, and which
does not touch any material interests the U.S. have.”86 Anderson notes the following: “Part of
the horror Britons felt at the actions of the United States reflected their shock at discovering
that the Americans apparently were willing to spill Anglo-Saxon blood for what they
considered a backward, racially inferior people like the Venezuelans.”87 The press and
prominent intellectuals deployed strong Anglo-Saxonist language in order to avoid a war.
James Bryce, Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain, and many others implored Americans to
avoid a war with their kin across the sea. Similarly, public figures in the United States urged
for a peaceful resolution to the impasse, employing the vocabulary of Anglo-Saxonism to do
so. Alfred Mahan, Colorado Senator Edward Wolcott, Andrew Carnegie, and others emulated
their elite counterparts in Britain by pleading with their countrymen to avoid an Anglo-Saxon
war.88
Finally awakening to the gravity of the situation (Ambassador Sir Julian Pauncefote
had erred quite badly in failing to realize this earlier), Britain quickly began backtracking.
350 M.P.’s publicly advocated arbitration, which Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain
86 Bryce to Villard, 4 Jan. 1896. Villard Papers. Quoted in Fisher, Bryce I, 320.
87 Anderson 98.
88 For a more detailed account of reactions in each country, see Ibid., 97-105. Anderson also notes that the
Anglo-Saxonist rhetoric was more prevalent during this incident in Britain than in the United States, which
lends credence to this dissertation’s assertion that Anglo-Saxonism generally was more significant to the United
Kingdom than to America.
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obtained in a visit to Washington in September of 1896. By 1899 the arbitration committee
sided largely with Britain, awarding Venezuela few of its claims. The event, now a minor
footnote in the history of Anglo-American relations, reveals that the development of the
Special Relationship was by no means a foregone conclusion even just two decades before its
inauguration. This incident further confirms that the transatlantic closeness of the twentieth
century cannot be traced to any popular grassroots sentiments – its origins lie elsewhere.
Settling the long-disputed boundary between Alaska and Canada provided another
point of strain in the closing years of the 1890’s. The Klondike Gold Rush of 1897 prompted
Canada to renew longstanding claims against America (so longstanding, in fact, that they
were originally against Russia) to important ports of access in what is now the Alaskan
panhandle. Initial negotiations broke down in early 1899, and for the next three years efforts
to resume them failed. By this time America had gained the upper hand in determining the
nature of the 1903 negotiations, virtually guaranteeing an entirely favourable outcome for the
United States’ claims (the “neutral jurists” deployed by Roosevelt were Senators Henry
Cabot Lodge and George Turner, as well as Secretary of War Elihu Root). Britain behoved its
representative Lord Lansdowne to cast his deciding vote on the commission in favour of
American claims as a testament to the United Kingdom’s desire for a closer relationship with
the United States.89
British citizens were irritated by the affair, feeling that their country had been
browbeaten into an unfavourable settlement (Canadians particularly felt that “London always
89 For more on this boundary dispute, see Perkins 162-173. Also, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy
Vol. III (New York: Macmillan, 1922) 298. Lansdowne was a highly important figure during this time. During
his long career, he held the posts (among others) of Governor-General of India and Canada, and was the War
Secretary during the Second Boer War and the Foreign Secretary shortly afterward (Roosevelt highly distrusted
him; see Perkins 107, 223). For Lansdowne during the First World War, see Winters, Frank. “Exaggerating the
Efficacy of Diplomacy: the Marquis of Lansdown’s ‘Peace Letter’ of November 1917.” The International
History Review 32: 25-46.
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sacrificed Canada on the altar of American friendship”).90 Another point of contention had
been removed, however, further clearing the path to Anglo-American harmony.
The last quarrel this section will consider concerns the negotiations that took place to
release America from the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 in order to unilaterally construct
and maintain (by force if necessary) a canal in Panama.91 With the 1850 treaty, both countries
had agreed to construct or fortify any such isthmian canal only in concert with the other
power. By 1899, however, Congress was clamouring for a canal with no regard to the prior
treaty.
While ten years earlier this might have provoked hostility, a new strategy for British
resource deployment had been developed in the interim that would largely rely on the United
States to defend the empire’s interests in the Americas against the encroachment of Germany
(at this point, greatly exaggerated). This would free up vessels and personnel for European
deployment. Rather than chafe against the Monroe Doctrine, Britain was deftly using it to her
advantage. Doing so required deference to American interests and recognition of its primacy
in the region.92
Secretary of State John Hay agreed to put a treaty Ambassador Pauncefote drafted to
each government in the beginning of 1899. Toward the end of that year, annoyed by
London’s lack of response, Congress moved to construct the canal without a treaty with
Britain. Pauncefote quickly received instruction to sign the agreement, which at that time
contained provisions for the canal’s neutrality and a prohibition against its fortification.
90 Perkins 171.
91 Canadians had hoped the British government would use their legally advantageous position in regard to an
isthmian canal as leverage for a favourable result in the Yukon negotiations. London quickly abandoned this
tack.
92 For a sound analysis of British strategy during the Panama dispute, see Grenville, J.A.S. “Great Britain and
the Isthmian Canal, 1898-1901,” The American Historical Review, 61 (1955): 48-69.
52
When the signed treaty was put to the Senate, however, it was modified to allow American
fortification. London in turn rejected this draft of the treaty (its objections were perhaps more
rooted in the manner in which the Senate had attached its amendments without consultation).
Another draft was produced (with no ban on fortifications and little attention paid to the
canal’s neutrality), this time more carefully and with input from both parties, and Britain
signed.
In both the Yukon and Panama, Salisbury’s government had courted American
friendship at the expense of interests that were minor to the British Empire. London, with an
eye toward trouble brewing on the continent, redistributed her resources and with the same
stone made overtures to one of the world’s next great powers (albeit clumsily at times).
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Economic and Military Interdependence
An important development that significantly drove Britain’s recognition of the
necessity of obtaining American friendship was the United States’ burgeoning economic
power. By 1898, America’s production of coal had soared 800 per cent from its 1865
production levels; steel rails 523 per cent; corn and wheat over 200 per cent; and refined
sugar 460 per cent. Carnegie Steel Company by itself outstripped all British production by
1901.93 In 1880, the United States produced 14.7 per cent of the world’s manufactured goods
– by 1900, 23.6 per cent (outstripping Britain) and by 1913 32 per cent.94 American
businesses were penetrating more and more realms previously monopolized by Britain. The
global ascension of the United States was a reality the United Kingdom chose to accept rather
than struggle against.
Transatlantic economic interdependence during this time was extensive. From 1869 to
1893, foreign trade amounted to 13.4 percent of the American gross national product (a trade
which depended on the freedom of the seas which Britain provided).95 Mead argues the years
1823-1914 constituted a second era in the United States’ foreign policy where America
“existed in a Britain-centred global order... concentrated on getting the best deal for itself
93 Parmar, Inderjeet. Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: a Comparative Study of the Role and Influence
of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945 (Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 50.
94 Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to
2000 (London: Fontana, 1989) 202.
95 Mead 14. Quoting the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial
Times to 1957, 542.
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within the British system... [and] looked forward to the day when it would surpass Great
Britain.”96
One important feature of this interdependence which significantly raised awareness of
the importance of friendly Anglo-American relations within American elites was the United
States’ dependence on the British navy during the Pax Brittanica. As a young nation,
America was vulnerable to attack for much of the nineteenth century. During the War of 1812
the British army had pillaged Washington, D.C. and threatened Baltimore and New Orleans.
As Mead records, “American foreign trade [upon which her economy was heavily dependent]
fell by 90 per cent between 1807 and 1814 as the British navy blockaded the coast of the
United States.”97 Weak coastal fortifications and a small navy prompted Ulysses S. Grant in
1885 to state that America was “without the power to resist an invasion by the fleets of
fourth-rate European powers.”98
The prominent American naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan recognised this
vulnerability. He maintained the absence of attacks from any “fourth-rate” European powers
owed itself largely to fleets of Britain. After the War of 1812, these had afforded protection to
America for most of the nineteenth century. In short, despite lacking the “ships, naval bases,
and colonies [which] were the keys to greatness,” the United States had indirectly enjoyed the
protection of the British Empire’s rule over the world’s seas.99 This served Britain’s interests
as well, as American goods and foodstuffs were important to her own economy.
The Sackville-West incident and the Venezuela affair, however, proved to the British
once again that Anglophobia was alive and well in many sectors of American society. The
96 Ibid., 82.
97 Mead 17.
98 Ibid., 19. Original in Grant, U.S. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 776.
99 May, Ernest 132.
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vitriolic tone of much of the American public during these incidents, together with an
occasionally condescending tone from Whitehall, combined to impede the advance of warmer
relations. In the cases of Canada and Panama, an increasingly isolated Britain reappraised her
situation and invited American friendship by yielding to the United States. The transatlantic
cordiality already significantly developed at the elite level, was now in its infancy
diplomatically.
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The Spanish-American War and the Great Boer War: Anglo-Saxonism in Action
Two wars impacted each nation tremendously at the turn of the century. The Spanish-
American War of 1898 thrust America into global imperialism for the first time, while the
Second Boer War (1899-1902) put further strains on the British Empire. As these two wars
are generally more well-known than some of the more minor irritants above, exposition is not
as necessary. Brief consideration of their effects on each country is.
For America, the sinking of the Maine acted as a lightning rod that brought a
thunderbolt forth from a storm for war that had been brewing in the United States for some
time.100 For much of the early nineteenth century, Americans believed that Cuba would
eventually become an American possession or even a state. While this presumption had
waned in the later decades of the century, “this long tradition of covetousness did give
Americans a sense of proprietary interest in Cuba... and even an obligation to be a dominant
influence on the island.”101 After many reports of Spanish atrocities against the Cuban
population, Congress declared war on Spain on 25 April, 1898.
100 For a discussion of the evolution of academic thought surrounding the Maine’s significance, see Perez,
Louis. “The Meaning of the Maine: Causation and the Historiography of the Spanish-American War,” Pacific
Historical Review 58 (1989): 293-322. For a more recent treatment of the subject of American motives, see
Grable, Bettye. “American Elitist Attitudes and Private Letters Influence President McKinley’s Decision to
Declare War in 1898.” Paper presented at the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical First Annual Research
Summit (2009): 51-77. Accessed via
http://www.famu.edu/DOR_division_of_research/The%20Proceedings%20of%20the%20FAMU%201st%20
Annual%20University%20Research%20Summit%202009.pdf#page=72 on 4/3/11 at 11:47 GMT. For a general
review of relevant academic literature, see Paterson, Thomas. “United States Intervention in Cuba, 1898:
Interpretations of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War,” The History Teacher 29 (1996): 341-361.
Kagan points out that the decline of conservative Democrats like Grover Cleveland at the hands of
populist ones like William Jennings Bryan “brought the Republicans back to power and weakened the
conservative forces in the Democratic Party that had long resisted Republican activism both at home and
abroad.” Kagan, Robert. Dangerous Nation: America and the World, 1600-1898 (London: Atlantic, 2006) 385.
101 Kagan 409.
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Kagan maintains the public’s willingness to undertake the war owed itself in large
part to the United States’ capability to undertake it: “the fact that many believed they could
do something to aid the Cubans helped convince them that they should do something.”102
This form of casus belli is obviously still prominent in the American public’s calculation of
appropriate military action today. Vigorously executed against a fast fading European power,
this war gave the United States significant overseas territory for the first time, notably Guam,
the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. With these new possessions, America became a world
player amongst the imperial powers of Europe for the first time.103
This war was preceded by and coincided with a renewed effort by London to
gain America as an ally either formally or informally, the former being recognized as a
remote possibility in both countries. The United States at this time was coveted as an ally
because of its rapidly increasing economic power and its lack of any real foreign obligation
or entanglement. As discussed above, this led the United Kingdom to yield to America in a
number of diplomatic situations during this time. London continued courting the United
States by subtly supporting her efforts in the Philippines, augmenting a brief stage of popular
enthusiasm in each country for the other – an enthusiasm which owed itself in no small part
to Anglo-Saxonism. Anderson notes that “no factor was more important than Anglo-
Saxonism in promoting good feeling between the British and American peoples.”104
Furthermore, the British political leadership and press were similarly “afflicted with Anglo-
102 Ibid.
103 One of Kagan’s best arguments in regard to the Spanish-American War is his rejection of the widespread
interpretation of the war as an aberration in America’s “isolationist” phase. Kagan generally rejects the
perception of America as isolationist; the Anglo-American interactions described in this dissertation support his
thesis. Ultimately, the Spanish-American War “reflected Americans’ view of themselves, stretching back to
before the nation’s founding, as the advance guard of civilisation, leading the way against backward and
barbaric nations and empires.” Ibid., 416.
104 Anderson 112. This goodwill actually prompted much of Britain to celebrate the Fourth of July in 1898.
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Saxonism.”105 American Anglo-Saxonism once again swelled, this time with a much greater
and more popular force.
Partially in response to this popular new feeling of friendship between Britain and the
United States, the Anglo-American League was established in England on 13 July 1898. The
organization drew its members from both sides of the Atlantic. Notably for this dissertation,
Albert Venn Dicey, Andrew Carnegie, and James Bryce were prominent members (Bryce
became a Deputy President in August 1918). Of even more interest for this thesis is the
strong rhetoric of Anglo-Saxonism present in the group’s literature. Its raison d’être was to
“give practical effect” to a resolution passed at the inaugural meeting of 13 July 1898:
Considering that the peoples of the British Empire and
of the United States of America are closely allied in
blood, inherit the same literature and laws, hold the
same principles of self-government, recognize the
same ideals of freedom and humanity in the guidance
of their national policy, and are drawn together by
strong common interests in many parts of the world,
this Meeting is of opinion that every effort should be
made in the interest of civilisation and peace to secure
the most cordial and constant co-operation between
the two nations.106
This resolution is a smörgåsbord of Anglo-Saxonism. America and the United Kingdom are
nearly the same in race and possess the same institutions and culture, the same principles and
ideals – including self-government, always a special point of emphasis for Anglo-Saxonists
as shown above. And closer relations were pursued not for selfish reasons, but “in the interest
of civilisation.” The principles and ideals of the United States and Great Britain had to be
shared for the benefit of all humanity. While the influence of this group is difficult to
determine, its existence, its members, and its stated purpose provide tangible evidence of the
105 Ibid., 116.
106 Bryce Papers, Eng. 22.60. Undated, c. 1900.
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late nineteenth century transatlantic elite’s desire to promote Anglo-American friendship,
often with the language of Anglo-Saxonism.
With America established as an imperial power, Britain had greater hope for an ally in
the future. But while the Spanish-American War galvanized imperial proponents in America,
the Second Boer War shook popular faith in the empire and further alienated Britain from the
rest of the international community. The British government had expected the conflict to be
over by the end of 1899. Instead, the war cost over £200 million and claimed the lives of
21,942 soldiers of the empire.107 And as with the Spanish-American War, advances in
communication and the development of mass media and widespread literacy made the public
more familiar with the horrors of this especially brutal war.108 While much of the popular
sentiment both within and outside of the Commonwealth was sympathetic to the Boers,
European governments and the United States government hoped for a British victory.109
The conflict impacted British society in a number of ways. During the war, the British
public’s belief in the importance of maintaining the empire was assailed by accounts of
concentration camps and brutal tactics undertaken against a civilian population. Additionally,
the reports of inhuman cruelty against Boer mothers and their children galvanized the
movement for women’s rights in Britain. But while support for closer ties with the
Commonwealth and momentum for some form of federal alteration to the empire suffered in
107 Pakenham, Thomas. The Boer War (New York: Random House, 1979), 572.
108 See Morgan, Kenneth. “The Boer War and the Media (1899-1902),” Twentieth Century British History 13
(2002): 1-16.
109 Lowry, Donal. “‘The World’s no Bigger than a Kraal’: the South African War and International Opinion in
the First Age of ‘Globalization,’” in Omissi, David and Thompson, Andrews, Eds. The Impact of the South
African War (2002): 277.
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some quarters, “the war had lacked the scope, intensity and duration to uproot established
structures and beliefs. The old order had bent a little: it had not broken.”110
Another significant effect of the Boer War was its influence on British attitudes
toward Ireland. While the benefits of the telegraph had made the administration of far-flung
colonies easier, they had also made the disease of revolution more highly communicable.
Ireland especially reverberated with both pro-Boer and Unionist fervour.111 Separatist
sentiment soared in support of the Boers, healing the old wounds of Parnell. Major John
MacBride led the Irish Transvaal Brigade and gained combat experience against the British
which he would later employ in the Easter Rising of 1916, for which he was executed. Boer
tactics also influenced Michael Collins. Sinn Fein itself was the partial successor to the Irish
Transvaal Committee.112
The war similarly impacted Unionists. The strength of Boer resistance which had
emboldened separatists alarmed loyalists like Lord Milner “to whom the Ulster loyalists were
Uitlanders threatened with helot status in a home-ruled Ireland.”113 Many British officers
during the struggle for Irish independence had served in South Africa and based their
strategies for suppressing the rebellion on their experience in the Transvaal.
American popular reaction to the war was primarily pro-Boer – the struggle of a small
band of colonists struggling to cast off English rule resonated with the American public.
Congress expressed similar sympathies. The foreign policy apparatus of the United States’
government itself, however, was decidedly pro-British. In fact, “the practical result of the
110 Darwin, John. “Afterword: the Imprint of the War,” Ibid., 296.
111 See Lowry 278-282.
112 McCracken, Donal. Forgotten Protest: Ireland and the Anglo-Boer War (Belfast: Ulster Historical
Foundation, 2003) 72-73.
113 Lowry 279.
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McKinley administration’s behaviour was a policy so favourable to Great Britain that
Secretary [of State] Hay repeatedly had to deny charges that a ‘secret alliance’ existed
between the two countries.”114 The Anglo-Saxonism within American policy-making elites
was less fickle than that which had appeared fleetingly in the general population during the
Spanish-American War. In the election of 1900 the Democratic candidate William Jennings
Bryan no longer struck fear into the hearts of British observers of American politics – Anglo-
Saxonism had cemented the bond between the two nations, one which no man could tear
asunder. Due to the efforts of Anglophiles like John Hay, Alfred Mahan, and Theodore
Roosevelt (as vice president and president), the government of the United States protected the
Anglo-American rapprochement during an outbreak of popular anti-British sentiment.
Theodore Roosevelt ascended to the presidency in 1901 following the death of
William McKinley. While Roosevelt strongly asserted American interests in diplomacy (as
with the Alaskan panhandle dispute discussed above), he was also a racial Anglo-Saxonist
who looked favourably on the British Empire, believing it to be “on parallel tracks” with the
United States.115 Minor popular irritants occasionally surfaced, such as the Anglo-German
action against Venezuela in late 1902 and early 1903 as well as the Olympic Games hosted
by Britain in 1908 (during which several questionable judgments by English officials
appeared to indicate a strong anti-American bias).116 Such popular Anglophobia dampened
expressions of Anglophilia (or Anglomania) and forced administrations and public officials
otherwise friendly to the United Kingdom to keep their sentiments quiet. But even in the face
William Howard Taft’s occasionally aggressive “dollar diplomacy” Britain was careful to
assert its interests in the western hemisphere only with significant deference to the Monroe
114 Anderson 131.
115 Perkins 106.
116 Ibid., 186-193 and 119-120.
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Doctrine. Even when the United Kingdom toed the line drawn by American administrations,
her respect for the doctrine in the past gave her the benefit of the doubt. Woodrow Wilson’s
election was welcomed by British society, as he was seen as a more enlightened Anglophile.
Despite some Anglo-American tension in Mexico, he was generally well-liked. Indeed,
Wilson’s efforts to remove Panama Canal tolls were highly praised in England, constituting
the first presidential action of the twentieth century to “venture a direct challenge to contrary
sentiment,” which is to say popular Anglophobia.117 Relations between the two nations had
certainly warmed since the Venezuela Affair.
Anglo-Saxonism played an important role in the conduct of Anglo-American relations
during the formative years and early careers of members of the Council on Foreign Relations
and Chatham House. It had the power to endear each population to the other or preserve good
relations between the two countries during times of popular resentment against the other.
Before turning to the CFR and the RIIA, it is necessary to briefly consider James Bryce the
diplomat and the First World War.
117 Ibid., 313.
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James Bryce: the Diplomat
In 1906 President Roosevelt was growing increasingly frustrated with British
Ambassador Sir Mortimer Durand and communicated this dissatisfaction to London in no
uncertain terms. After much thought, the Foreign Office called on James Bryce.
Bryce’s mental acumen, significant fame, expertise on American government,
physical vigour (a near-requirement for all ambassadors during Roosevelt’s White House,
owing to his penchant for strenuous hikes), and prior friendship with the president made him
an outstanding selection for the office. In 1907, the new ambassador (who postponed a
peerage to avoid charges of elitism) set out to remove the remaining thorns in the side of
Anglo-American friendship.
Many of these irritants were Canadian-American issues of relatively minor
significance. By paying significant attention to the interests of Canadians (even audaciously
visiting the Dominion he represented) he earned their good will. He systematically hammered
out agreements with the United States on water boundaries, fishing rights, land boundaries,
and sealing rights, among others. The man with whom Bryce was chiefly negotiating at this
time was Secretary of State Elihu Root. The two developed a rapport which soon turned to
friendship (Root was added to the list of venerable names among Bryce’s correspondences).
While pleased with these agreements, Bryce’s primary goal as ambassador was to
secure a strong arbitration agreement for the two nations. This ambition eluded him, however.
Perhaps his greatest contribution was as “an ambassador between peoples, not
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governments.”118 His gruelling public speaking schedule and many public appearances
endeared him to the American people and helped to diminish some of the Anglophobic
sentiment in the United States. He also wisely avoided the mistakes of previous ambassadors,
as when he left the country during the presidential election of 1912.
He stepped down as ambassador in April, 1913, as the threat of war extended its dark
shadow over Europe.
118 Seaman 207.
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The First World War
This thesis regrettably avoids significant description of the First World War owing to
length restrictions. A brief summary, however, is helpful to establish the context of the
analysis that follows.
The competitive arms race which swept Europe during the opening years of the
twentieth century transformed the continent into a powder keg. On 28 June, 1914 the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand provided a spark. During that summer, the British
Empire found itself drawn into a war for which it was ill-equipped and under-prepared. No
one expected “a four-year struggle in which ten million died and the old Europe committed
suicide,” but that is precisely what happened.119 During the war, Britain sustained massive
casualties, lent out large amounts of money to its Allies, and borrowed to the hilt to finance
its own contributions to the conflict, almost exclusively from the United States. On 6 April,
1917, the United States entered the war, helping to mitigate the damage done by the
withdrawal and collapse of Tsarist Russia. By mid-1918 the American forces were making an
impact; by autumn, the Central Powers unexpectedly sued for peace. In December,
delegations from around the world gathered in Paris to negotiate the terms of peace. It was
there that the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs
first organised.
Having established the important trends and events affecting both American and
British elites in the decades prior to World War I, it is now necessary to consider the other
119 Reynolds, David. Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (Harlow:
Pearson, 2000) 87.
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side of the watershed: namely, the disaffected elites of Versailles who came together to form
the Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House and the extent to which they were
influenced by the developments already presented. By examining their backgrounds, their
ideologies, and their hopes for the New World Order, we may identify the reverberations of
the Victorian and Edwardian ages.
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Photos
Lord James Bryce, about the time of his ambassadorship to America.
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Portrait of Lord Milner.
Portrait of Lionel Curtis.
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Photo of Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), September 1940.
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Hamilton Fish Armstrong (L) with Henry Kissinger (R), c. 1957.
Isaiah Bowman on the cover of Time, 23 March 1936.
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Victorian Echoes in the Royal Institute of International
Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations
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The Round Table and the Inquiry
The “Prophet” and the Round Table120
Two organizations served as the primary forerunners to Chatham House and the CFR:
the British “Round Table” movement and the American “Inquiry” group. Many members of
these organizations would later become prominent members of Chatham House and the CFR,
and a number of these individuals met with men of the other respective group prior to the
First World War, exchanging ideas and laying the groundwork for their future collaborations.
Our consideration begins with the Round Tablers, who were first in establishing their
organization.
The British Round Table movement and its magazine of the same name were largely
founded by former members of Lord Milner’s “Kindergarten.” Milner served as High
Commissioner for Southern Africa during the Second Boer War, later serving as
Administrator and Governor- General of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony from 1901-
1905. He gathered a number of talented young civil servants around him, including Lionel
Curtis, Philip Kerr, Patrick Duncan, Richard Feetham, and Lionel Hichens. The closeness of
these men “derived from the influences of Oxford in general and New College and All Souls
in particular” had significant impact upon their success as administrators following the
departure of Lord Milner from South Africa in 1905.121
120 The most thorough, chronologically sound account of the Round Table movement is Alexander May’s
doctoral thesis “The Round Table, 1910-66.” PhD thesis, St. John’s College, Oxford, 1995. See also John
Kendle’s The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1975).
121 Nimocks, Walter. Milner’s Young Men: the “Kindergarten” in Edwardian Imperial Affairs (London: Hodder
& Stoughton, 1970) 53. Note as well that these men were members of one of the first generations of graduates in
a reformed Oxford, discussed above.
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The spectre of imperial decline that had loomed around the periphery of Britain’s
national consciousness in the closing decades of the nineteenth century had more fully
materialized as a result of the disastrous Second Boer War. The men of Lord Milner’s
Kindergarten were in the eye of the storm and witnessed its aftermath – thus, they developed
their thoughts about what could be done to save the empire and preserve Britain’s place in the
world with a keen awareness of the wants and needs of her possessions. These men attempted
to implement an administrative scheme in South Africa which they and Milner believed could
snatch the entire empire from the jaws of rot: federalism.
As discussed above, those advocating some form of federalism within the empire
were naturally drawn to the example of the United States. D.C. Watt lists three reasons for
this group’s interest in the United States: America’s success as a large federation, the two
nations’ “common culture and common purpose,” and their hope for the United States’ help
in upholding British supremacy in Europe.122 In examining the triumph of American
federalism, these men drew upon the information contained in Bryce’s American
Commonwealth, but the more important source of inspiration for these men was F.S. Oliver’s
1906 book Alexander Hamilton: an Essay on American Union. Rather than a simple
biography, the work maintained that the British Empire was at a crossroads similar to that
which faced the Framing Fathers of the U.S. Constitution in 1789. The period in American
history had been one in which nearly all men favoured a closer union, but the devil was in the
details. For Oliver, this was a position all too familiar to citizens across the empire.123 And
just as the predicaments were alike, so too might the solutions be similar. The men of
122 Watt, Donald Cameron. Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in
the Twentieth Century (London: Longmans, 1965) 30. Watt also notes that James Bryce “is of considerable
influence here.” Ibid, n. 1.
123 Oliver, Frederick Scott. Alexander Hamilton: an Essay on American Union (London: A. Constable and,
1906) 454-455.
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Milner’s Kindergarten read the book and debated its conclusions – by and large they
supported them, as the inclusion of Oliver in the Round Table movement shows.124
Following a trip to Canada by Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr, and William Marris to
determine interest in imperial reform in 1909, Milner met with a number of his former
Kindergartners on 23 and 25 January, 1910 to discuss their plans for imperial union. These
meetings are generally considered the birth of the Round Table Movement.125 With the quiet
but substantive support of Milner, this band of former Kindergartners (who referred to
themselves as “the Moot”) pursued federal imperial reform.126 While reform-minded elite
academics of Bryce’s generation had tried to exert influence from within Parliament, these
Oxford men sought to effect reform from outside Britain itself.
In order to achieve this “organic” union, the Round Tablers believed they needed to
create two perceptions: that the demand for imperial reform was popular and (more
importantly) that it came from the Dominions. After securing the support of local elites by
establishing Round Table chapters across the empire, the central organization in London
would release its plan for organic union, the main features of which the Commonwealth
124 The influence of the U.S. Constitution itself is also apparent in a post-war Round Table proposal for a
constitution establishing an Imperial Parliament; before enumerating its powers, the draft states “all other
powers [will be left] to the national legislatures,” in much the same way that the powers not explicitly assigned
to the United States’ Federal Government are reserved to the states. In another section on a proposed Irish
legislature, a bicameral legislature is called for with “two Houses styled the ‘Irish House of Commons’ and the
‘Irish Senate.’ (Names not yet finally determined. Lords or Peers? House of Representatives? [typed note in
original]). See Lothian Papers, GD40/17/499.
125 Nimocks 155. Watt, David. “The Foundation of the Round Table: Idealism, Confusion, Construction.” The
Round Table 60 (1970): 425. Milner’s diary entry for 23 January 1910 lists Curtis, Kerr, Duncan, Feetham,
Oliver, Lord Lovat, George Craik, Hichens, and Leo Amery as present. See Milner Papers, 81. Unfortunately,
Milner’s diary entries are quite brief and do not provide substantive details of either meeting.
126 As a trustee of the Rhodes Trust, Milner was able to direct significant funds to the Round Table until his
death in 1925. See Nimocks 143. Rhodes himself was a firm believer in Anglo-Saxonism and a major proponent
of imperial reform: “his life ambition was ‘the furtherance of the British Empire, the bringing of the whole
uncivilized world under its rule, the recovery of the United States of America, the making of the Anglo-Saxon
race into one Empire.” Marlowe, John. Cecil Rhodes: The Anatomy of Empire, 64. Quoted in Shoup, Laurence
and Minter, William. Imperial Brain Trust: the Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy
(New York: Monthly Review, 1977) 12-13.
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chapters would vigorously promote in their respective Dominions. The hope was these ideas
would resonate with the general public in each, as dissatisfaction with the existing imperial
scheme abounded.127 This would in turn produce a change in policy (or politicians) that
would ease the path of imperial reform.
This strategy compelled the movement to conduct its affairs with an air of secrecy and
“mystery and anonymity.”128 In 1910, Kerr wrote to Curtis of the importance of subtly laying
the groundwork for their proposals throughout the Dominions before advocating them too
publicly: “…we want to make people familiar with the idea of Federation, so that they will be
all the more ready to swallow our gospel when it is published.”129 Dougal Malcolm wrote
Curtis in a similar vein in 1911, stating “you know better than any of us how important it is
that our pistol should not go off at half cock.”130 The language in these letters is borderline
insidious, but there is no evidence to support the notion the Round Tablers were attempting to
maliciously dupe the public. Rather, the movement was attempting to shepherd public
opinion (by first influencing elites) into supporting an idea which these men firmly believed
was in their best interests.
With hindsight, the Round Table’s plan seemed far-fetched and unlikely to draw
much support. Even if the political environment had been receptive to a federal modification
of the imperial system, the task would have been monumental – the Round Tablers had to
orchestrate a swift and extreme change in public opinion in Britain and in four Dominions
scattered across the globe simultaneously in order to begin this monumental task. But as May
127 “The movement springs up from inside each Dominion amongst the people themselves, and becomes their
own spontaneous movement…our function [is]… to bring them seed so that they may grow the food for
themselves.” Curtis Round Table Papers, 805.30. Curtis to unknown recipient, 9 September 1910.
128 Kendle 305.
129 Curtis Round Table Papers, 805.26. 31 August 1910.
130 Curtis Papers, 2.63. 25 March 1911.
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states, although “the ultimate failure of proposals for Imperial federation is apt to lend their
promoters an air of naïveté, even irrelevance... it is important to bear in mind the
‘ambivalent’ and ‘transitional’ nature of colonial nationalism.”131 What scholars now identify
as an inevitable, burgeoning nationalism within the Dominions could be reasonably seen as
something very different by Round Tablers: a growing assertiveness and autonomy which
showed the Dominions “were now ripe for some share of the responsibilities and burdens of
Imperial affairs.”132 Nonetheless, the movement may well have been a forgettable flash in the
pan – were it not for the efforts of one man.
Lionel Curtis was by far the Round Table’s most impassioned advocate of a federalist
solution to Britain’s ills. Despite environments hostile to federalist imperial reform in both
London and the Dominions, “Curtis’ enthusiasm dragged his friends at his chariot wheels.”133
He possessed an earnest charisma and a friendly disposition that made him a natural leader,
though his supreme assurance in himself and the rightness of movement could blind him to
obvious practical concerns and make him inflexible. For the devout Curtis, the Round Table
was not simply a movement – it was a sacred cause, a critical crusade to protect the
Commonwealth. “It is indeed impossible not to feel that this is the Lord’s doing,” Curtis
wrote to his mother.134 He saw himself as an instrument of God:
After all if in this world we accomplish anything of utility it
is but as the tools of God, the strength and purpose must be
His…how foolish the chisel and mallet would look if they
could speak and were to proclaim themselves the authors
of the carpentry.135
131 May, Alexander 37.
132 Ibid.
133 Watt, David 431.
134 Curtis Papers, 2.1. 1 June 1910.
135 Curtis Papers, 2.35. 30 November 1910.
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Anglo-Saxonism believed the world’s English-speaking peoples to be a race divinely
destined to usher in the world’s greatest era – Curtis believed himself to be one of God’s
agents bringing about that destiny. In fact, other Round Tablers soon started calling him “the
Prophet.”136 Divine or not, the passion that animated Curtis fuelled the Round Table
movement and kept it alive longer than an impartial assessment might have predicted.137
Anglo-Saxonism had a profound effect on the group from its inception. In a
memorandum of a series of conversations among Kindergartners in South Africa during the
summer of 1909, Curtis wrote that
Some kind of union, stable because rooted in
realities, is the only means of securing the
political ideals of the race – real nationality and
self-government to those capable of exercising it,
and to those which are not, government in the
interest of the governed themselves.138
The Round Table recognized the English-speaking peoples’ capacity for self-government. In
fact, Round Tablers did not merely recognize this – they presumed it.
Watt notes that “all these men started with the normal assumptions of the Edwardian
Imperialist faction… belief in the destiny of the British people and a profound conviction that
the British race… had the power and duty to civilise and rule.”139 The notions of unity among
the world’s Anglo-Saxon peoples that had been developed during the last forty years of the
nineteenth century were now ubiquitous – they were the foundations of an intellectual
framework which had been developed to secure the empire and to cultivate the friendship of
136 Curtis Round Table Papers, 845.125. 18 September 1917. David Kerr (Philip’s younger brother) bestowed
the nickname as an Oxford undergraduate in 1912 while Curtis was the Beit Lecturer in Colonial History. See
Nimocks 208.
137 Curtis himself was not blind to the likely possibility that the movement might fail. See Curtis Papers, 2.10
and 126.166.
138 Curtis Papers, 156/1.1
139 Watt, David 427. Emphasis added.
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the United States, a necessity for preserving Britain’s global influence. The racial elements of
Anglo-Saxonism, however, were not as warmly embraced by the Round Table. In 1913
Curtis wrote in an official Round Table document that it was problematic to discern “qualities
inherent in the English which distinguish them above their neighbours on the Continent,” and
that “it is impossible to establish any theory of racial superiority.” Therefore, “English
success in planting North America… must, in fact, be traced to the respective merits not of
breed but of institutions.”140 Generally, “the imperialism of Curtis and Kerr, in particular, was
primarily cultural rather than racial.”141 Despite their disavowals, some of the racial rhetoric
of Anglo-Saxonism did still affect the Round Tablers, as seen in the memorandum above.
Curtis had initially expected the movement would establish a series of magazines
throughout the empire that would ponder the imperial question, hoping that these would
eventually advocate federal reform with the “bottom up” approach the group favoured. On a
whirlwind tour throughout the Commonwealth in late 1910 and early 1911, Curtis established
local Round Table chapters in South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. Rather
than trying to attract as many members as possible, Curtis and the Round Tablers believed
their plans could be more effectively realized by enlisting the help of a small section of like-
minded elites in each Dominion.142
It is important to note that these groups were established in order to study the imperial
“problem” rather than to advocate a specific solution. As a result, the plan for an organic
union that the Kindergartners planned to develop had to attract the support of each national
Round Table chapter. Needless to say, this constituted yet another stunningly difficult task.
140 Curtis Papers. 156.9. Page 207.
141 May, Alexander 38.
142 In regard to this, Curtis wrote to his mother that “if only there are a dozen just men, Sodom and Gomorrah
themselves can be saved” (it is likely the metaphor refers to the doomed twin Old Testament cities’ imminent
destruction rather than any of their other characteristics). Curtis Papers, 2:10. 4 August 1910.
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Curtis began working on this plan after his Dominions tour in 1911. Together with
Kerr, Oliver, and others, Curtis further developed the fundamental principles of the Round
Table movement in a document which quickly came to be known as “the egg.” For Curtis, the
imperial problem would result in one of two outcomes: independence for the Dominions or
“organic unity,” by which he meant some form of federalist restructuring. The egg obviously
advocated the latter, holding that the British Empire had to become a true Commonwealth.
This required that all “fit” citizens across the Dominions assume a responsibility to one
another by creating a new entity that would serve the interests of the governed. For Curtis,
[o]bligation and not privilege, duties and not rights, lay at
the root of citizenship…it was an obligation owed not to
a monarch or to an abstraction labelled “the State,” but to
the whole body of one’s fellow citizens, organised as a
community in obedience to law.143
In 1916 Kerr would add that a commonwealth, rather than a state which demanded
unflinching obedience from its citizens, was “a society of human beings living in one
territory united by a common obedience to laws the purpose of which is the enlargement of
liberty.”144 Blind nationalism, therefore, was an impediment to justice and world peace. The
greatest hope for an end of war was the Commonwealth, which Curtis hoped might
eventually attract more and more new members, until global government might be achieved
(idealism was not in short supply within the Round Table movement).145
By the end of 1913, Curtis and the Round Table realized the impossibility of creating
a document of proposals for imperial reform that would be acceptable to the various chapters
of the Round Table. Additionally, even if such a document could be produced, the Round
Table was ostensibly an impartial research group, advocating a specific course of action
143 Kendle 172.
144 Kerr, Philip. “The Principle of Peace.” The Round Table 23 (1916): 392.
145 See Curtis Round Table Papers, 873.126.
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would contradict this. By May 1914, the Moot decided to produce three large volumes
entitled “Round Table Studies” for distribution to the Dominion chapters and a shorter work
for public consumption (the “omelette”), written by Curtis, who would take sole
responsibility for the publication so as not to jeopardize the movement’s objectivity too soon.
Ultimately, however, the Moot would reorganize and become an advocacy organization
following the publication of its proposals.146
The “Round Table Studies” (also largely written by a heavily worked Curtis) clearly
bear marks of influence by the liberal intellectuals of the late nineteenth century already
examined in this thesis. 1912’s “Instalment A” is rife with quotes from Bryce, Freeman,
Seeley, Dicey and others.147 Curtis’ treatment of history, however, was a cause for concern
for many academics within and outside the group – his broad analysis was often simplistic,
the staggering breadth of historical subject matter somehow always supporting his assertions.
Kendle includes a portion of a Fabian Ware letter stating that the studies’ history was
“wicked” and that “a little more Grote and a little less Dicey, Bryce, and Freeman…and they
would have been more trustworthy.”148 The inclusion of so much history may be indicative of
Curtis’ (and, to a lesser extent, the Moot’s) idealistic naiveté: so obvious was their solution
that all the lessons of human experience seemed to confirm it. Questionable history aside,
these studies are tangible evidence of the influence of late-nineteenth century liberal thinkers,
a theme further explored below.
146 Kendle 175-180.
147 Curtis Round Table Papers, 156.9. Bryce’s Studies in History and Jurisprudence quoted on p. 9, his Holy
Roman Empire p. 10, etc. Freeman’s History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy quoted on p. 27, his
Greater Greece and Greater Britain p. 28. Seeley’s Introduction to Political Science quoted on p. 55. Dicey’s
The Law of the Constitution quoted on pp. 93-95, etc.
148 Kendle 175. Quoting Ware to Jebb, 24 December 1912. Original in Jebb Papers. Ware was an administrator
under Milner in South Africa (though not considered a member of the Kindergarten) and letter the editor of the
Morning Post.
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The beginning of the First World War in August did not initially hamper the
momentum of the Round Table movement – if anything, Britain’s act of committing the
Dominions to war augmented it. The core group in London felt the end of hostilities would be
a moment ripe for publishing Curtis’ “omelette” (titled “The Problem of the
Commonwealth”), thereby provoking a public consideration of the imperial problem which
might be debated at the first post-war Imperial Conference. “The Problem of the
Commonwealth” laid out the facts of the imperial imbalance and subsequently included a
series of specific proposals as solutions –including the explosive topic of endowing an
Imperial Council with taxation powers over the Dominions. In March 1916, a copy was
leaked to The Toronto Star. This forced the London Round Table’s hand, and the work was
published quickly as an act of damage control. Curtis travelled to Canada, New Zealand, and
Australia to put out any fires and to emphasize that the publication was his own while also
reminding members across the Dominions that the Round Table welcomed alternative
proposals for consideration.149
Unfortunately, the damage in Canada was done. Subscription began to drop and the
various chapters, sensing a swelling tide of anti-imperialism, “now launched vehement
protests against the publication of [Curtis’] volume” and soon largely withdrew themselves
from the public eye.150 As the most important Dominion, Canada had been the lynchpin of
the movement’s hopes for imperial reform. The suspicion and distrust of everything
“London” that had strengthened during the Alaskan panhandle dispute of the late 1890’s and
early 1900’s still resided in the minds of many Canadians and ultimately contributed to the
decline of the Round Table’s effectiveness on its most important battleground.
149 Ibid., 189-198.
150 May, Alexander 101. See also Curtis Round Table Papers, 845.228. Also, Milner Papers, 169, Massey to
Coupland, 30 July 1917. Quoted in Kendle 223.
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“The Problem’s” early release damaged the Round Table movement in another
important way. While still an impartial study group in name, the group’s most prominent
leader (and the main face of the Round Table in the Dominions) had advocated the creation
of an imperial parliament. Some Round Tablers in London supported this position – a fact
which many members throughout the Commonwealth knew and disapproved of. The strains
of the protracted First World War and the resulting swell in Dominion nationalism further
complicated the picture. “The Problem” now appeared aptly named – and for the wrong
reasons.
Ultimately, the Round Table movement’s efforts of federal imperial reform
floundered on the rocks of Dominion nationalism and the divided attention of the
Commonwealth, such reform having been “more attractive in the abstract than as a specific
and detailed proposal.”151 Despite this failure, the movement’s magazine marched on.
151 May, Alexander 95.
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Lord Lothian and The Round Table
Although the Round Table was ineffective in achieving its goal of significant imperial
reform toward the eventual goal of organic imperial union, the movement’s magazine did
play an important role as a forum for ideas about the First World War and the post-settlement
global order. This distinction owed itself in no small part to its first editor.
While Curtis’ strength was his persuasive passion, the strength of The Round Table’s
initial editor was his practical intelligence. Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian) had struck his
superiors in South Africa “with his clearheadedness” and his “tremendous industry.”152 A
close friend of Curtis, the two men’s distinct talents complemented each other, Curtis’
unswerving belief in Imperial Union drawing many to the Round Table movement and Kerr’s
careful, purposeful editing producing a magazine which the American Ambassador Walter
Hines Page soon called “the best review, I dare say, in the world.”153 While their relationship
was not without tension, the two remained dear friends, Curtis once telling Kerr, “You know
what I have always said, that I am only one blade of the scissors, and cut nothing unless I am
hinged with you.154
Circulation of The Round Table was not especially widespread during this time. Nor
was this a priority for Round Tablers; rather, members wanted the magazine to reach those in
a position of influence, in order to arm them with the “facts” of international relations. This
was much the same modus operandi that led Curtis to recruit the support of limited numbers
of men across the Dominions in local Round Table chapters. The entire organisation’s
152 Butler, J.R.M. Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr): 1882-1940 (London: Macmillan, 1960) 18.
153 Ibid., 45.
154 Ibid., 38.
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membership can only be described as elite in nature. Kendle writes that “most of the
movement’s members were representative of the affluent, the well-placed, the intellectual,
and generally the most acceptable members of society… it was essentially a white, Anglo-
Saxon, Protestant organization of the upper middle class with aristocratic underpinnings.”155
The Round Table was a group of elites attempting to influence other elites in positions of
power – The Round Table’s limited readership was not a cause for concern. If anything, it
was the goal.
One of the tensions in Kerr’s relationship with Curtis’ arose as a result of Kerr’s
realization that parts of the mission of the Round Table movement (not so much “the
furtherance of close and friendly relations between the Commonwealth and the U.S.” as “the
creation of an imperial super-state”) were not entirely compatible.156 This placed Kerr in the
somewhat awkward position of editing a magazine whose raison d’etre he considered
quixotic. Nonetheless, the journal thrived under his editorship (Curtis’ hope to establish many
such journals across the empire did not come to fruition). And although Kerr was its editor,
“the Moot’s collective responsibility for what was published in The Round Table was an
important element in maintaining the consistency of the magazine.”157 The Round Table also
took on an important role during WWI as an organ of British persuasion that helped “to gel
and solidify a significant section of elite opinion within the USA” on behalf of the Allied
cause.158
155 Kendle 305.
156 Roberts, P. “The Role of Philip Kerr and The Round Table in Anglo-American Relations.” The Round Table
95 (2006): 126. Watt, Donald 29.
157 May, Alexander 78.
158 Roberts, P. “Philip Kerr and The Round Table” 127. See also Nimocks 195.
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To this end, Kerr recruited George Louis Beer, a Canadian-born American historian,
to contribute a series of articles to The Round Table.159 Beer wrote of the justness of the
Allied cause, and following the entrance of the United States into the war in 1917 predicted
that German aggression would serve as a catalyst for closer Anglo-American relations,
making “the English-speaking cultural unity a real and effective force in directing the future
evolution of the world.”160 In another article he asserted “the virtual identity of the
fundamental political ideals and principles that constitute the inalienable heritage of all
English-speaking peoples.”161 The Round Table was preaching the gospel of Anglo-Saxonism
first developed by Dilke, Fiske, and Hawkins nearly fifty years prior.
Kerr himself employed the language of Anglo-Saxonism in his own writings. In a
letter dated November 14, 1919, Kerr called for Anglo-American cooperation in the post-
Versailles world:
Personally, I am convinced that not only America but the
Dominions also will have to take an active share in
giving some kind of order and good government to the
backward world, which is otherwise going to be
chaos…America…can’t stand out of [the]
responsibilities of international government.162
Here Kerr was invoking one of the most fundamental tenants of Anglo-Saxonism: that the
English-speaking peoples of the world were charged with a sacred civilizing mission, a duty
to spread Anglo-Saxon institutions, ideals, and mores across the globe. Without these, the
world would be chaos – only the British Empire together with the United States possessed the
159 Articles in The Round Table were originally published anonymously in order to illicit frank opinions from
prominent men who would not otherwise be in a position to state them on the record. Knowledge of an article’s
authorship, however, was often well-known among the magazine’s small readership community. Nonetheless,
its official anonymity allowed plausible deniability for the author. For examples of the identity of an article’s
author being widely known, see Curtis Round Table Papers, 853.152 and 869.30.
160 Beer, George Louis. “America’s Entrance into the War.” The Round Table 27 (1917): 514.
161 Beer, George Louis. “America’s War Aims.” The Round Table 30 (1918): 255-256.
162 Butler 78.
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tools to free the earth from anarchy by bringing the light of Anglo-Saxonism to the darkness,
a darkness that must be made to understand.163
In these ways the inheritance of the Victorian and Edwardian age is clearly visible in
the pages of The Round Table.
163 “The light burns bright in the darkness, but the darkness has not understood it.” John 1:5. Author’s
translation.
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Anglo-Saxonism, the Round Table, and the Post-War World
The Round Table movement played an important role in pre-war Britain. The themes
Curtis and the Round Tablers were employing in the egg and subsequent studies were
prominently featured into British justification for its entry into the First World War and
British analysis of the war’s causes. For the United Kingdom, Bismarck’s Germany was the
embodiment of a nation whose citizens gave their loyalty first and foremost to their state,
rather than their other citizens, the law, or humanity. This notion and others like it during the
era of the First World War have most greatly affected the current world order. The Round
Tablers were by no means their sole developers, but their writings about these themes
represent their most important ideas in many ways. What are now termed as “Westphalian”
concepts of the state, where national sovereignty is supreme, were being seriously challenged
for the first time. In its place a new order had to be established where the world’s citizens felt
a responsibility not only to their state, but to all humanity.
Another aspect of the Round Table movement’s influence relevant to this dissertation
is the number of personal relationships these men forged with prominent Americans whom
they would continue their relationships with after the conclusion of the Great War. From its
inception, the Round Table men enjoyed the use of Lord and Lady Astor’s Buckinghamshire
mansion “Cliveden” as its unofficial retreat.164 Both before and after the war, future members
of the CFR such as Norman Davis, Frank Polk, and Paul Cravath enjoyed Cliveden’s
164 Lord and Lady Astor were especially close friends of Kerr.
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hospitality, discussing the importance of future Anglo-American cooperation with prominent
Round Tablers and British politicians.165
In important aspects, the themes of Anglo-Saxonism developed in the nineteenth
century were a precursor to the language employed to advocate the new world order. At its
very essence, Anglo-Saxonism sought to emphasize a transnational bond, a commonality
which all “English-speaking peoples” shared. It was a bond that stood apart from nationality
and boundary, one which existed at a molecular level. The imperial federalists of Bryce’s era
had employed this language to promote a series of political reforms, which they envisioned
would include distinct nations bound together. The Round Tablers (while still using Anglo-
Saxonism to encourage the development of a “real” Commonwealth) emphasized the world’s
collective humanity in order to create a post-war order of mutual responsibility that
dampened the deleterious effects of unfettered nationalism. In this respect, knowledge of the
events, trends, and ideas of the late nineteenth century is essential for understanding the
Britons (and Americans) at Paris in 1919 who advocated a major shift in the conduct of
international relations.
The Round Table movement was yet another bearer of the banner of federalist
imperial reform, a rejuvenated form of the liberal internationalism that had animated Bryce
and his contemporaries. Both groups believed Britain’s global hegemony was threatened, and
both believed that the implementation of some form of federalism into the empire might
protect and even rejuvenate it. Both looked to the United States as an example of successful
federalism, and both hoped for warmer relations with America in order to establish English-
165 Roberts, Priscilla. “Philip Kerr and The Round Table,” 127. Round Tablers had enjoyed the use of Cliveden
for several years prior to the outbreak of war. In a letter to Winston Churchill dated 12 August 1912, Curtis
mentions that he is looking forward to seeing Churchill at Cliveden over the weekend and that he would be
bringing a wealthy New Zealander with governmental influence to discuss imperial naval issues. Curtis Round
Table Papers, 806.237.
89
speaking hegemony throughout the world. To this end, both invoked varying forms of Anglo-
Saxonism, be it racial, cultural, or institutional. Neither can be described as successful – few
of their federalist goals were achieved. Their greater contribution lies in their efforts to court
the friendship of the United States (and to establish mechanisms for its maintenance) and
their contribution to the development of language and ideas that advocated more substantive
internationalism. Many members of the Round Table movement helped to create a prominent
mechanism of Anglo-American accord, the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
established at Paris in 1919. Before turning to the Paris Peace conference, however, it is
necessary to consider the origin, members, development, and evolution of the American
Inquiry.
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The Inquiry and the Majestic Meeting
While the Round Table movement had more organic origins, the American forerunner
of the Council on Foreign Relations was established in 1917 by President Wilson in order to
prepare the United States for the post-war negotiations following the capitulation of
Germany.166 Colonel Edward House, Wilson’s closest adviser, had advocated the importance
of academic involvement in the groundwork for a peace conference – though the significance
the president himself assigned to this operation is debatable.167 Unlike the Round Table,
therefore, the Inquiry Wilson established was not a movement toward a lofty, faraway goal –
it was a taskforce with a specific mission, one which would expire with the conclusion of
peace negotiations.
Wilson gave Colonel House free rein in the setting up the Inquiry. For its director, he
chose his brother-in-law Dr. Sidney Mezes, president of the City College of New York.
Walter Lippmann, a staff member of the New Republic, became secretary. The organization
used the facilities of the American Geographical Society in New York and the mental acumen
of its director, Dr. Isaiah Bowman. The intellectuals which the Inquiry gathered were an array
of young, talented scholars and business leaders with wide-ranging expertise. Lippmann
166 The exact impetus for the Inquiry’s establishment is uncertain. Tillman, for instance, maintains that distrust
of Allied objectives in the peace conference (specifically British) prompted the foundation of the Inquiry. See
Tillman, Seth. Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP,
1961) 17-18. Smith, however, believes that Wilson’s distrust of his own foreign policy apparatus is responsible,
specifically his Secretary of State Robert Lansing. See Smith, Neil. American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer
and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley: University of California, 2004) 119. Williams points out that
Wilson would have been “naturally inclined to the advice of fellow academics.” See Williams, Andrew. Failed
Imagination? The Anglo-American New World Order from Wilson to Bush (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2007)
37. Additionally, Wilson’s letters to Colonel House indicate a more neutral desire to ascertain what the other
Allies “will be inclined to insist upon as part of the final peace arrangements.” See Seymour, Charles (ed.). The
Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. III (London: Benn, 1926) 169.
167 Grose, Peter. The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996. Accessed via
http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/inquiry.html on 11/4/11 at 10:15 GMT.
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boasted “we are skimming the cream of the younger and more imaginative scholars… [men
of] sheer, startling genius.”168
The organization quickly swelled, with competent researchers and specialist scholars
joining the Inquiry quite frequently (by the end of the war it had mushroomed into a group of
126).169 The group’s leaders and scholars both began to feel that increasing disorganization
was undermining the Inquiry’s mission and poised to drive away almost half of its key
players.170 In a bold move, Bowman tendered his resignation as a way of forcing Mezes,
whom he considered incompetent, to step aside and allow Bowman to assume leadership of
the Inquiry. The American Geographical Society’s support of the Inquiry was essential – the
loss of the director would be a fatal blow. Mezes realized this and partially abdicated, and
House gave unofficial control to Bowman.171
The Inquiry members developed what they believed was an objective approach to
research that would aid in the production of a “scientific peace.”172 To the Inquiry, this meant
a peace based on indisputable scientific data, a settlement “not predicated on the national
power interest of any single government but instead… based on the disinterested finding of
specialists whose work would reflect those principles acceptable to the nations participating
in the peace.”173 The data they gathered contributed significantly to Wilson’s “Fourteen
168 Ibid.
169 Nielson, Jonathan. “The Scholar as Diplomat: American Historians at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.”
The International History Review 14 (1992): 232, n. 14.
170 Smith, American Empire 127.
171 Lippmann had left the organization shortly before. Further squabbles between Mezes and Bowman ensued,
though Bowman ultimately triumphed.
172 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy, 26. Smith, American Empire 118-120.
173 Gelfand, Lawrence. The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919 (Westport, CT: Greenwood,
1976) 16.
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Points” of 8 January, 1918, although the more abstract, philosophical elements of the speech
belonged to Wilson and House (despite Lippmann’s assertions to the contrary).174
When the American delegation arrived at Brest aboard the USS Washington on 14
December, 1919, it included 23 Inquiry members.175 Confusion about what their
responsibilities would be at the conference abounded (as well as resentment of their assigned
quarters aboard the Washington).176 While they were unsure of their purpose, there were
keenly aware of the resentment against them held by members of traditional American
foreign policy organs. Friendly faces and like minds seemed to elude the men of the Inquiry
at this time.
The Round Table, however, had just published an article which piqued the interest of
some men within the American delegation, including Inquiry members. Might the Inquiry’s
own Round Table contributor, George Louis Beer, be able to facilitate a meeting in Paris with
its author?
174 Williams, Andrew. Failed Imagination? 38-39. For Lippmann’s assertion that the Fourteen Points were “the
second time that I have put words into the mouth of the President,” see Steel, Ronald. Walter Lippmann and the
American Century (New York: Vintage, 1981) 134. Original in the Bowman papers.
175 Gelfand cites the Washington’s passenger list contained in the Wilson papers as listing 23 Inquiry members
aboard. Twelve more Inquiry members joined these 23 in Paris (the author has been unable to determine
whether these twelve arrived before or after the 23), including Samuel Eliot Morison and Archibald Cary
Coolidge. See Gelfand 168-169, 183, and Nielson 243.
176 Both Smith and Parmar make a point of noting the poor accommodations afforded to members of the Inquiry
aboard the USS Washington as evidence of their mistreatment and neglect, taking this as an omen of their rough
treatment and frustration during the peace conference itself (See Smith, American Empire 145 and Parmar,
Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 225 n.2). In some of his most direct interaction with members of the
Inquiry aboard the USS Washington on 10 December 1918, however, Wilson was frank in stating his views and
appreciation of the Inquiry’s work, inspiring confidence among those present, including Isaiah Bowman and
George Louis Beer. See Link, Arthur, et al. (eds.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Vol. 53 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton UP, 1966) 350-357. Gelfand goes into greater depth in tracing the myriad reasons for the
“disheartened spirits of the Inquiry men” at this time. See Gelfand 169-176.
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“Windows of Freedom”
In the December 1918 issue of The Round Table (the last issue printed before the
conference officially began in January) an article appeared under the title “Windows of
Freedom.” And while the article, as with all Round Table contributions, was published
anonymously, those at Paris interested in talking to its author seemed to have no trouble
finding him. Indeed, Lionel Curtis rarely missed a chance to talk about his passions and
worldview.177
“Windows of Freedom” addressed what Curtis believed would be the Paris Peace
Conference’s most pressing issues, as well as the shape the post-conference world should
take. In it, Curtis once more articulated what he and other Round Tablers like Kerr advocated
as a means of creating a new global paradigm of international relations that would prevent
further war. The antiquated balance of power principle that had dominated Europe for
centuries had to be cast aside and a new emphasis on universal responsibility to humanity had
to take its place. The nature of nineteenth century international relations “did little to remind
nations of a duty owed to the world at large” and naturally led to competitive arms races and
world war.178 Curtis believed substantive participation and cooperation by the United States
and Great Britain would secure a new paradigm of peace.
The continued maintenance and prosperity of the British Commonwealth was one of
the greatest guarantors of future peace for Curtis: “her own existence and that of the world’s
177 Curtis, Lionel. “Windows of Freedom.” The Round Table 33 (1918): 1-48.
178 Ibid., 6.
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freedom are inseparably connected.”179 In fact, the Commonwealth was “freedom
incarnate.”180 Despite this, the strain of supporting the Dominions and possessions upon the
citizens of the United Kingdom (coupled with wartime casualties and expenditure) meant that
she could not take on any significant further burdens after the conclusion of the conference.
One of these burdens would be the custodianship of the world’s undeveloped regions.
Curtis believed, as was quite common at the time, that the world’s “uncivilised races”
were incapable of self-government, and that their only hope of achieving this was “learning
to do so…in tutelage by some great democratic civilised nation.”181 And the nation with the
most promise as a caretaker and global stabilizing force was the United States. And yet (as
Curtis well knew) the American tradition of isolation, only recently broken, still resided in
large portions of her population. In places “Windows of Freedom” appeared to plead with the
United States to take her rightful place in the world: “Is it too much to ask that in this crisis of
human destiny America shall forget to think of herself…Having put her hand to the plough,
can she look back? Can she now shrink from the dignity of her calling?”182 America’s future
position in the world was the most important outcome of the peace conference: “the future of
the system depends upon whether America will now assume her fair share of the burden.”183
While “Windows” spoke with hope of a future world order buttressed by Anglo-
American cooperation, it viciously condemned the German people for their “sheer
ferocity.”184 Curtis lamented the lost glory of Germany in tones of Christianity: “the light was
179 Ibid., 11.
180 Ibid., 21.
181 Ibid., 33.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid, 36.
184 Ibid.
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theirs, and they sinned against it.”185 Hammurabi’s justice lay in store for her people: “She
must know that to live by the sword is to perish by the sword, and that what men sow, that
they must reap. In weariness, poverty, hunger, cold, and remorse a whole people must learn
that lesson.”186 The eventual treaty signed at Paris would grant Curtis his wish, to his later
dismay.
In “Windows of Freedom,” Lionel Curtis outlined his vision of a post-war world
where the British Commonwealth and the United States would guarantee peace and justice. It
would generate considerable discussion among American and British delegates at Paris,
playing a key role in the creation of the Institute of international Affairs.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid., 37.
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Meeting Minds
Before the negotiations had even begun, members of the British and American
delegations were forming personal relationships with one another. Not surprisingly, a number
of Round Tablers joined the British delegation, including Philip Kerr (acting as private
secretary to David Lloyd George) and Lionel Curtis (in an advisory capacity to the British
delegation).187 As a member of the Inquiry and a frequent contributor to The Round Table,
George Louis Beer served an important function as a sort of transatlantic intellectual
matchmaker. American General Tasker Bliss’ diary entry for 22 December 1918, for
instance, records a meeting he had with Curtis which had been arranged by Beer. It was to be
an omen of further cooperation. As this entry is quite illuminating, it deserves significant
quotation:
Mr. Lionel Curtis called at half past three with Dr. Beer and I
was unwilling to cut short my most instructive conversation
with him, and which lasted until after five o’clock… he is a
most intelligent man and evidently deeply informed on
world affairs of great importance. I told him that I had been
deeply interested in reading his recent article entitled
“Windows of Freedom”… he said that the essence of his
idea, which had simmered in his mind for years was
contained in the opening sentence of the article, “The future
position of America in the world, not that of German,
Austria or Turkey, is the great issue which now hangs on the
Peace Conference.” He believes that the great problems of
the world now, such as many which must be settled or
attempted to be settled at the Peace Conference, are
peculiarly problems for the Anglo-Saxon race. For this
reason he bitterly regrets the split which separated the
187 In his position as Lloyd George’s private secretary, Kerr often corresponded with James Bryce, frequently on
Armenian issues. While Bryce’s influence is difficult to determine, it is not likely that it was very great.
Nonetheless, Kerr assured him that “I will do everything I can to keep your point of view before the British
delegation.” Bryce Papers, 206.4. Kerr to Bryce, 14 January 1920. See also Bryce Papers 245.64 and Lothian
Papers, GD40/17: 207.
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Americans from the English, resulting in the establishment
of two governments. Nevertheless, he believed that the
English were fully imbued with the idea that in spirit the
Americans were one with them and would work together
with them for the peace of the world… on this general line
our conversation proceeded for a couple of hours and then
Mr. Lionel Curtis took his departure, I being greatly pleased
with him and he, I think, carrying away a good opinion of
me.188
While no overtly Round Table themes are detectable, this entry is rife with information
highly relevant to this thesis, most notably Curtis’ invocation of tenets of Anglo-Saxonism.
Once more Curtis is speaking the language of transatlantic Anglo-Saxonism (both men were
fluent in the tongue), eliciting a noticeable response in Bliss. Again, the burden of the world’s
most pressing problems demanded the attention of English-speaking peoples, as only their
institutions could provide permanent solutions. And at the centre of Anglo-Saxon unity was
the importance of cooperation between Britain and her lost colony.
We also see in this passage a significant feature of the early days of the Special
Relationship. Here is a Briton urging increased American involvement on the world stage – a
two-man drama playing out a larger story of the United Kingdom coaxing a skittish United
States out of the shell of her isolationism. And while America as a whole remained
unconvinced of the necessity of post-war involvement in global affairs, this one man became
convinced. So too would many of the other members of the American delegation.
188 General Tasker Bliss diary, AC 5069, box 65. Reproduced in the Curtis Round Table Papers, 869.30. James
Shotwell also mentions Curtis’ “Windows of Freedom” as having a profound effect on American and British
representatives at the peace conference. See Curtis Round Table Papers, 852.152.
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The Conference Begins
The high hopes and idealism of the thirty-five Inquiry members selected to the
American delegation soon began to wane amidst the power plays and political posturing of
Versailles, that “fiesta of egos and intrigue.”189 The men soon found that Wilson was
“listening to no one” and that varying groups of American experts were manoeuvring
themselves in such a way that the Inquiry would soon find itself outflanked.190 Not to be
outdone, Bowman quickly convinced House to place Inquiry men in a primary position,
above even the State Department and Military Intelligence – Bowman even used American
servicemen to “reallocate” prime office space for his own men in the middle of the night.191
While green American diplomats were sometimes the subject of scorn or derision at
the Paris Peace Conference, the cartographers led by Bowman, now chief of the Intelligence
Section, soon gained a reputation as the conference’s best map men.192 On 21 January, the
Inquiry submitted a condensed report of its analysis and recommendations to Wilson and
other American plenipotentiaries entitled “An Outline of Tentative Recommendations.” This
report came to be known as the “Black Book” and was followed by the “Red Book.”193 Other
delegations “feverishly requested it as soon as its existence became known,” as the document
189 Smith, American Empire 139.
190 Schulzinger, Robert. The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992) 2.
191 Smith, American Empire 146.
192 Ibid., 148.
193 The “Black Book” dealt with territorial and labour concerns, while the “Red Book” addressed further
colonial questions.
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was the American “playbook” and contained some of the conference’s best maps and
statistical data.194
There is not room for this dissertation to engage in a systematic analysis of these
reports. They are significant, however, for two reasons. First, these reports and the work of
Inquiry members at Paris generally strongly supported British claims: “its bias was
unmistakably anti-German and, with few exceptions, enthusiastically pro-British… [it also
retained] decidedly negative assessments of French, and especially Italian, diplomacy.”195
Secondly, they are devoid of any explicitly stated worldview. They are a reflection of the
Inquiry’s origin and mission as a research organ whose primary purpose was to arm the
president and the U.S. delegation with the “facts” of the issues addressed at Versailles and the
likely positions of other states in negotiations. In this way, the primary forerunner to the
Council on Foreign Relations is quite unlike the antecedent to its sister organization. The
Round Table was an advocacy group ostensibly encouraging the impartial research of an
“imperial problem.” As shown above, however, the core leadership maintained its own
beliefs on the problem’s solution and sought to promote it. Therefore, in considering the
Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute for International Affairs, it is important
to bear in mind the differences in their origins.
In February, Wilson disbanded the Inquiry, completing its merger with the American
Commission to Negotiate Peace into the Division of Territorial, Economic, and Political
Intelligence. Its members were assigned to various multinational committees. In these
committees the academic researchers (who had not previously expected this level of
194 Smith, American Empire 147. For the “Black” and “Red Books” generally, see also Nielson 237-238, 250.
For a more thorough account of their analyses and proposals, see Gelfand esp. 182 n.1, 235-238, 265-267, 322-
325. Gelfand notes that these works “will remain for the historian the central statement of the work of the
Inquiry and its contribution to the Peace Treaty.” Ibid., 182, n.1.
195 Nielson 250.
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influence) found themselves working to resolve some of the practical issues of the
conference. Largely academics, the men of the Inquiry were not trained as diplomats,
“positions for which few had experience of training.”196 Furthermore, Sir James Headlam-
Morley lamented that “neither the British nor the Americans have any competent diplomatist
among the plenipotentiaries.”197
While they worked with men from many nations, the candour that marked their
relationships with the British delegates was unique. In fact, on 3 February, 1919 Sir James
Headlam Morley wrote “we have also received instructions to have a free interchange of
views with the Americans (this must be kept very confidential).”198 John D. Fair notes that
“besides meeting on the commissions, where the daily work was done, the British and
American specialists were constantly dining with one another in their respective hotels.”199
Unencumbered by significant barriers of language or culture, these men could enjoy a free
exchange of ideas.
The friendly candour of Britons and Americans at the conference did not indicate
similar feelings of public opinion in each country. While the fervour of the assembled men
was palpable, it was nonetheless tempered with level-headed considerations of the domestic
effects of the treaty. James Shotwell and other Americans were naturally more aware of their
countrymen’s capacity for Anglophobia than their British counterparts. While the Britons
were not totally ignorant of this tendency in the United States, they could not fully
196 Nielson 237.
197 Headlam-Morley, James, in Headlam-Morley, Agnes, et al. (eds.). Sir James Headlam-Morley: a Memoir of
the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (London: Butler & Tanner, 1972) 8.
198 Headlam-Morley 18. The editors note that these remarks are “among the most important in his diary,” though
“little is known about the secret Anglo-American talks and their scope.” Ibid., n.1. In the same volume,
however, Headlam-Morley describes these meetings, during which the American “Black Book” was exchanged
for the British “Outline of Tentative Report and Recommendations” prepared by the Intelligence Section. Ibid.,
33.
199 Fair, John D. Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm (Newark: University of
Delaware, 1992) 148.
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comprehend its nature – they had grown up in a Britain that emphasized her similarities to her
lost colony, a Britain that largely presumed kinship with the United States. Listening to their
“colonial” colleagues, they began to appreciate the potency of America’s Anglophobia.
As early as 3 March, James Shotwell anticipated that there would be serious obstacles
to the kind of Anglo-American cooperation these men envisaged after the treaty. Headlam-
Morley recorded the following in his diary about Shotwell’s predictions:
He anticipates a revival of the distrust with which
Great Britain is traditionally regarded and thinks
that the pro-German feeling which was strong in
large sections of the population before the war will
revive…there will be many people in America who
will incline to the view that Germany has been
purified, but that England has not been. The
traditional republican feeling…is very strong and
American sympathy will tend to drift towards a
republic in Germany.200
These predictions would prove to be remarkably astute in the years after the conclusion of the
Paris Peace Conference.
While “there was a fundamental community of purpose and interest between the
United States and the British Empire,” Tillman notes, “…this basic unity, although often
expressed in parallel and even identical policies, was almost never translated into a common
strategy for the attainment of common objectives.”201 Nielson, however, observes that in
February 1919, “no one in the U.S. delegation expected unity or harmony [in negotiations] –
except perhaps with the British.”202 Despite their governments’ inability to coordinate their
approaches, the substance of their policies was more similar to each other than any other
200 Headlam-Morley 38-39.
201 Tillman 401.
202 Nielson 240.
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government. The closeness of American and British researchers and other more minor
players at Versailles reflected this.203
203 E.g., Headlam-Morley’s work with Inquiry member Charles Haskins on the Saar committee. See Nielson
244-245.
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A House Divided Against Itself
The American delegation to Paris was rife with in-fighting, notably in March, 1919.
The controversy surrounded the delegation’s position on the fate of Rijeka (or Fiume as the
Italians called it) on the Dalmatian coast. The Italians were insistent on including Rijeka
within its borders instead of the new Yugoslavia, a position which Wilson, the French, and
the British were against. Colonel House, however, struck a closed-doors bargain with Italian
leaders to yield to their demands without the knowledge of Wilson, whom he intended to
convince later. Together with his brother-in-law Mezes, House led the president to believe
that the Adriatic experts within the American delegation supported Italian claims.
In fact, Bowman and every one of his Adriatic experts were dead-set against them.
House’s play was soon found out, impairing his relationship with Wilson to the point of
nonexistence. Mezes’ only remaining influence had rested in his own relationship with his
brother-in-law – House’s demise was also Mezes’.204
The delegation members who had set out with hope for a new world were fast losing
faith in their mission and their leaders. When the peace terms came out in May, Adolf Berle
wrote “I suppose somebody is satisfied with them; in any event we are not.”205 In a letter
strongly requesting a transfer (the serviceman’s resignation), Berle wrote on 15 May that
the treaty as prepared seems in large measure to have
abandoned both the letter and spirit of [American war]
pledges…[a] conclusion of the proposed treaty will not,
204 Smith 156-164.
205 Berle, Adolf. Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971: from the Papers of Adolf A. Berle (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1973) 12.
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in my judgment, serve either the idealistic or material
interests of America, or, indeed, of humanity.206
Berle was joined in May by William Bullitt, Joseph Fuller, John Storck, George Bernard
Noble, and Samuel Eliot Morison (the only Inquiry member to tender his resignation).207
The sense of disillusionment which had prompted these resignations pervaded the
British and American delegations. Strife had been snatched from the jaws of peace. Many felt
the treaty’s “vindictive ferocity” was sowing dragon’s teeth; Bryce wrote that ‘it is a Peace of
Revenge, which will produce a counter-revenge.”208 But out of this desperation, Lionel Curtis
saw an opportunity to salvage the burning wreckage of the Round Table’s initial mission of
imperial reform, as well as a chance to foster closer Anglo-American relations.209
On the evening of 30 May, Curtis gathered a group of about ten American and twenty
British delegates to meet at the Majestic hotel. The British delegates present included James
Headlam-Morley, Arnold Toynbee, Harold Nicolson, Lord Cecil, Philip Kerr, Lionel Curtis,
and J.R.M. Butler. Americans included Beer, General Tasker Bliss, James T. Shotwell,
Archibald Cary Coolidge, and Ray Stannard Baker.210 General Bliss and Lord Cecil chaired
the meeting.
It is important to note that this was not simply a meeting of Round Tablers and
Inquiry members. Headlam-Morley, Harold Temperley, Philip Baker, Nicolson, Charles
206 Ibid., 13. Berle received transfer orders on June 30.
207 See Ibid., 12. Quoting a London Daily Herald article dated 22 May, 1919. The article numbers nine
American resignations, Bowman among them. Bowman had not actually resigned; rather, he took a leave of
absence to be with his children and tend to American Geographical Society business. His return to Paris on
October 4 further confirms the lack of a resignation. See also Nielson 248-249.
208 Bryce Papers, USA 2.183. Bryce to Eliot, 20 March, 1919. Bryce Papers, USA 2.187. Bryce to Eliot, 4 June
1919.
209 “The foundation of Chatham House was a necessary tactical change to effect the same strategic object [as the
Round Table’s].” Quoted in Bosco, Andrea and Navari, Cornelia (eds.) Chatham House and British Foreign
Policy 1919-1945: the Royal Institute of International Affairs During the Inter-War Period (London: Lothian
Foundation, 1994) 2. Original in “The Lionel Curtis-Philip Kerr Correspondence,” Annals of the Lothian
Foundation, Vol. I, 394.
210 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 27-28.
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Webster, Clement Jones, Frank Walters, Cecil Hurst, and Butler were all present at the
Majestic meeting, but none of them were Round Tablers. Likewise, Whitney Hart
Shepardson, General Bliss, and Baker were not Inquiry members. Nonetheless, the main
organizers of the meeting (Beer and Curtis) were members of the Round Table and the
Inquiry, and both groups were well represented at Majestic. As shown above, Curtis saw this
meeting as an opportunity for a new organisation to pick up the banners which the Round
Table had previously carried.
Lionel Curtis, together with George Louis Beer, brought these men together in the
hope of “making permanent the intellectual bond that had developed between the technical
experts” of their countries’ respective delegations.211 These experts were not satisfied with
the treaty they had helped to produce. As Lord Cecil stated at the meeting: “There is no single
person in this room who is not disappointed with the terms we have drafted. Yet England and
America have got all that they want…our disappointment is an excellent symptom: let us
perpetuate it.”212
211 Curtis Round Table Papers, 853.152. Address before the International Conference of Institutes of World
Affairs given by James T. Shotwell, 20 October 1953. Shotwell states that “it was chiefly Curtis himself and the
American correspondent of The Round Table, the historian George Louis Beer, who conceived” this idea.
Interestingly, Shotwell suggests that this meeting included Germans. The Institut für Auswärtige
Politik was founded in Hamburg in 1923 as a sister-institute to the British Institute of International Affairs, but
their possible presence at the Majestic meeting is difficult to determine. Harold Nicolson’s diary entry for 30
May, for instance, records the evening’s purpose as a discussion of “the formation of an Anglo-American
Institute of Foreign Affairs” and makes no mention of any German presence. Headlam-Morley likewise wrote
“the whole thing is to be a co-operation between England and America.” Arnold Toynbee also mentions only
Britain and America in his recollection of the meeting in 1969. In his 2004 book, Parmar likewise makes no
mention of any German presence nor any intention of their future inclusion. See Nicolson, Harold. Peacemaking
1919 (London: Methuen, 1964) 352-353. Headlam-Morley 132. Toynbee, Arnold. Experiences (London:
Oxford University Press, 1969) 60-62. And Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 27-28.
Unfortunately, Curtis’ diary entry for this date is missing, likely due to a fire in his home in 1933 which
destroyed many of his records. The curious inclusion of the Germans by Shotwell deserves further
consideration, although it may be simply attributable to the nature of the institution he was addressing.
212 Nicolson 353.
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The views which Curtis expressed to the men at Majestic of what was necessary to
secure the post-war world strongly echoed Round Table themes and its modus operandi.
Future peace
would depend upon how far public opinion in these
countries would be right or wrong. Right public
opinion was mainly produced by a small number
of people in real contact with the facts who had
thought out the issues involved.213
Once more, the manner in which this new organisation would achieve its goals was by
influencing elites. This was not to be an organ of mass propaganda, but an elite group of
researchers persuading elite groups of decision makers. Headlam-Morley recorded in his
diary on 31 May that it was agreed “admission must be difficult so as to avoid a great mass of
incompetent members who are admitted to many other learned societies in order to get
funds.”214
The institution this meeting established also resembled the methods of the Inquiry in
respect to the emphasis placed upon creating a “private society for the scientific study of
international affairs.”215 Toynbee adds that by “scientific” the assembled delegates meant the
work of the new institute would be “objective, unbiased, unpartisan, [and] un-emotional.”216
This underscoring of the “scientific” production of the facts of international relations can be
traced back to Victorian “scientism” displayed by Bryce and his contemporaries.
The initial Majestic meeting established a committee of six which would draft a plan
to create an Anglo-American “centre of authoritative opinion.”217 On 12 June the men met
213 Fair 148.
214 Headlam-Morley 133.
215 Toynbee, Experiences 61.
216 Ibid.
217 Nicolson 353.
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again to elect a council and pass items proposed by the committee. The Institute of
International Affairs was now official.
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Important Distinctions and Similarities between the Inquiry and the Round
Table
Ultimately, identification of the Inquiry as the primary forerunner to the Council on
Foreign Relations is problematic, requiring qualification. The Inquiry was not, as the Round
Table, a group of like-minded men who had come together of their own accord to address an
issue about which they felt passionately. The Round Tablers had been developing a
worldview for years prior to the peace conference – the Inquiry was created by in 1917 by
executive order. It was a data-gathering taskforce which would in effect cease to exist when a
treaty was signed. Its mission was to produce a “corpus of reports and recommendations to
clothe the President’s principles with the necessary justification for their practical
application.”218
The Inquiry, therefore, did not develop a distinct worldview as an organization in the
same way that the Round Table did. The men of the Inquiry developed their own worldviews,
often significantly influenced by Wilson and Round Table members like Lionel Curtis, but
not exclusively so. As the following section will show, there was a great deal of continuity
between the Round Table’s ideology and the Royal Institute of International Affairs’. In
considering the relationship between the Council on Foreign Affairs and the Inquiry,
however, more care must be taken in drawing the same sort of parallels that exist with
Chatham House and its predecessor. Nor was the meeting at Majestic simply a meeting of
Round Tablers and Inquiry members, as discussed above.
218 Gelfand 333.
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Nonetheless, the influence of Victorian and Edwardian Anglo-Saxonism, scientism,
and liberal internationalism can be clearly seen in the interaction of British and American
delegates at the Paris Peace Conference. With these qualities and qualifications in mind, we
can more accurately determine the Inquiry’s proper place in the history of the Council on
Foreign Relations. Before doing so, this thesis will examine the Royal Institute of
International Affairs.
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The Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Council on Foreign
Relations
Hurdles for Chatham House
As with the Round Table, the British Institute of International Affairs (BIIA) relied on
the energies and persuasive power of Lionel Curtis. In its early days, two threats loomed over
the institute: a hostile Foreign Office and a lack of funding. Lionel Curtis’ strategic
manoeuvring and persuasive powers resolved both issues.
During the 30 May, 1919 meeting at the Hotel Majestic, the Assistant Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Eyre Crowe expressed his concerns in regard to the
nature of the proposed relationship between the nascent institute and the Foreign Office.
While Headlam-Morley dismissed this critical speech, Crowe’s stance that overlapping
membership and candid expression of ideas might become incompatible with each
institution’s character was well-founded.219
The Foreign Office had long fiercely protected its monopoly on the development and
execution of British foreign policy.220 The office was suspicious of any organisation that it
perceived might dilute its influence. Crowe, a grizzled Foreign Office veteran, worried a new
conduit of policy development might open the office to the influence of private interests.
Furthermore, he felt that the most likely candidates for recruitment by the new institute would
be the office’s more junior officials, who “not always fully informed, and without
219 Headlam-Morley 132.
220 “A monopoly of the conduct of foreign affairs was this Foreign Office family-circle’s historic prerogative.”
Toynbee, Experiences 63.
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responsibility, are not the most suitable exponents of grave matters of foreign policy to the
outside world.”221 Finally, Crowe believed as a matter of policy that no members of the
Foreign office ought to ever express their private opinions “on the affairs which they are
called upon to conduct in accordance with their official instructions.”222 Supported by
Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office Lord Hardinge, Crowe urged the matter to
be referred to Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur Balfour and his successor Lord Curzon.
Not surprisingly, Lord Curzon shared Crowe’s concerns. Writing to Balfour on 28
July, he stated:
To allow individual members of the Foreign Office to
join a Society, whose main object is the free
interchange and propagation of opinions upon
matters connected with the business of the
Department, would seem to me to be subversive of
discipline and derogatory to the authority of the
Secretary of State.223
Months after its inception, the institute was in real danger of being completely shut off from
Britain’s primary foreign policy organ. Curtis sprung into action, assuring Curzon and
Balfour of the strict rules of privacy surrounding the group’s activities. The organisation
would strive to provide a neutral environment for the exchange of research. Curtis bent over
backward to remove the Foreign Office’s reservations, inviting the office to send a
representative to the institute’s meeting to draft a constitution and offering to send an advance
copy of the BIIA’s history of the Paris Peace Conference to the office for comment.224
These concessions apparently reassured Lord Balfour of the feasibility of Foreign
Office interaction with the BIIA (Balfour had not felt the same level of unease as Curzon
221 Dockrill, Michael. “The Foreign Office and the ‘Proposed Institute of International Affairs 1919.’” In Bosco
78. Original in Foreign Office Archives, FO 608/152.
222 Ibid., 79,
223 Ibid., 80. FO 608/162.
224 Ibid., 81-82.
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about the proposed scheme).225 In fact, Balfour presided over the institute’s official
inauguration at the Astor’s home in St. James Square on 5 July 1920. This prompted Sir
Clement Jones to boast “the Foreign Secretary himself is playing on our side from the start of
the game.”226
This early tension owed itself in no small part to Curtis’ and the men of Majestic’s
realisation of the importance of public opinion, a realisation which still eluded the Foreign
Office.227 Parmar lists three primary reasons for the BIIA’s interest in public opinion as a tool
to accomplish its mission. First, “a mobilized public opinion would help to undermine the
influence of conservative forces that adhered to autocratic styles of making foreign
policy.”228 These “conservative forces” most notably included the Foreign Office. The second
reason Parmar lists is that “a properly ‘educated’ public opinion would permit the formation
and implementation of more ‘sound’ foreign policy,” which would erode the dominance of
rabble-rousing politics.229 Finally, “an educated public opinion would help to legitimise
official foreign policy and that state.”230
Parmar and others are also quick to point out that the institute’s definition of public
opinion was narrow and quite different from modern perceptions of the term. D.C. Watt notes
225 Anglo-Saxonism also heavily influenced Balfour. In a letter to Philip Kerr dated 18 March, 1911, Balfour
wrote “I am, and always have been, a Pan-Anglican – that is, I have always held that the English-speaking
peoples have traditions, interests, and ideals which should unite them in common sentiments, and, in not
inconceivable eventualities, in common action.” Curtis Round Table Papers, 785.51.
226 Sir Clement Jones quoted in Williams, Paul. “A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the
Chatham House Project, 1919-1939.” International Relations 17 (2003): 41. Original in “The Origins of
Chatham House” (no date), mimeo. In Margaret Cleeve, “The Early Years of Chatham House, 1919–1921:
People Consulted etc.,” RIIA File 2/1/2a.
Toynbee notes that while permanent officers of the Foreign Office were initially banned from the RIIA,
they quickly received permission to become members and to attend meetings. They were even soon allowed to
speak at the meetings. Toynbee, Experiences 64-65.
227 Prior to and immediately after the First World War the Foreign Office was “still about zero per cent public-
relations-minded and on hundred per cent security-minded.” Toynbee, Experiences 63.
228 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 166.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
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that Chatham House’s perception of public opinion existed “in the Edwardian sense of those
close to parliament, the City, the universities, industrial and public affairs,” while Parmar also
adds the press and London’s gentlemen’s clubs.231 The correlation to the Round Table
movement is quite obvious here. The BIIA sought to effect change indirectly by influencing
those with the power to implement their worldview, just as the Round Table before it had
done.
For Curtis and the BIIA, individuals had a duty to their state in the same way that
their state had an obligation to humanity at large. Herein lay the importance and potential of
an invigorated and enlightened public opinion – by guiding an emboldened public opinion in
the right direction, Chatham House hoped it might alter an antiquated, oligarchic foreign
policy apparatus. And when this had been done, Britain could take its proper place in the
promotion of a new global paradigm that dampened caustic nationalism and emphasized
international responsibility for all humanity.
The other significant hurdle facing the BIIA in its early days was the issue of funding,
which had to be provided by private donors.232 Fortunately for the BIIA, Lionel Curtis had no
equal in separating wealthy men from their money in the name of a worthy cause. Indeed,
“for the first fourteen years Curtis sustained the Institute more or less single-handed,”
prompting the organisation’s treasurer to list him as its most valuable asset in 1931.233 By
wringing many of the same hands that had sustained the Round Table, Curtis obtained
funding which allowed the BIIA to mature into an established and secure institute. Toynbee
and other Chatham House members lamented Curtis’ absence during his work with the
231 Watt, Donald. Foreword in Bosco i. And Parmar, Inderjeet. Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy, 167.
232 The cash-strapped BIIA had to hold many of its first meetings in the Round Table office. See May,
Alexander 241. Prominent donors included Lord Astor, Abe Bailey, Colonel R.W. Leonard, Sir John Power, and
Sir Henry Price. Ibid., 242-243.
233 Lavin, Deborah. “Lionel Curtis and the Founding of Chatham House.” In Bosco 67.
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Colonial Office on Ireland, confident that “when he turns his attention again to his hobby of
raising funds for Chatham House, the money is certain to begin coming in again.”234 In
addition to securing funding, Curtis convinced Colonel Reuben Leonard to Commonwealth to
donate the building at number 10 St. James Square, the now-famous Chatham House which
lends its own name to the institute itself.235 And in 1923 Curtis persuaded the Duke of
Devonshire to obtain the support of the Prince of Wales for the BIIA, making it the Royal
Institute of International Affairs.236
Inderjeet Parmar has gathered the most comprehensive data concerning the
membership characteristics of the RIIA. Using four sample years (1920, 1930, 1940, and
1950), Parmar establishes that 84 per cent of Chatham House’s governing Council upon
whom information was available were educated in public schools, and 74 per cent earned
their undergraduate degrees at Oxford or Cambridge.237 Thirty-one were Members of
Parliament, 28 of whom had ministerial positions. Fifty-seven of these men held 174
directorships “in some of the largest industrial, commercial, and financial institutions in the
country and Empire.” Club membership was also quite high. Among the overall membership,
106 were high-ranking military officers, 113 were academics, and 270 were titled. It was an
indisputably elite organisation.238
234 Toynbee, Experiences 78.
235 Bosco 66.
236 Obtaining Chatham House and the Royal Charter were also means by which Curtis placated some of the
strong feelings of American resentment among the RIIA’s financial backers. In a letter to Shepardson dated 29
December 1925, Curtis wrote “we have our Senator Lodges and plenty of them ready at any moment to use
anything against Philip or me which looks like evidence we are trying to Americanize the Institute.” Curtis
Round Table Papers, 872.104.
237 Council members for this sample number 103. Educational information was available for 75 of them.
238 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 31-36.
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The Split, Early Research, and Anglo-Saxonism
By June 1920, it became clear that the original plan of two branches of one
transatlantic institute was unfeasible – in fact, both branches came to this same conclusion at
roughly the same time.239 This was due not only to the inherent difficulties of
communication, but to the rising tensions between Britain and the United States that were a
hallmark of Anglo-American relations for much of the interwar period. In the United
Kingdom, America’s failure to join the League of Nations had angered some officials; the
real point of friction, however, was the explosive issue of war debts. With interest rates
casually set during the war at market levels, post-war Britain and France struggled to pay
down their principal debt. In turn, demands for German reparations increased. And as James
Shotwell had so insightfully predicted, German sympathies in the United States swelled
together with Anglophobia.240
239 See Grose. Accessed via http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/inquiry.html on 11/5/11 at 01:52 GMT.
240 Though often forgotten in the wake of Anglo-American cooperation in the Second World War, interwar
tensions between the two countries were so high that an Anglo-American war was not inconceivable. In 1927,
Winston Churchill himself stated that while it was “quite right in the interests of peace to go on talking about
war with the United States being ‘unthinkable,’ everyone knows that this is not true.” Bell, Christopher.
“Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War, 1918-1931.”
The International History Review 19 (1997): 790. Quoting Gilbert, Martin (ed.). Winston S. Churchill, 1030-
1035. Philip Kerr wrote “together they [Britain and America] can prevent future war, but… divided they will not
only be unable to prevent war but will get into competition and war with one another.” Lothian Papers,
GD40/17: 97.
Williams lists three further points of Anglo-American friction: “competitive naval building…the Irish
question and the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.” Williams, Andrew. “Before the Special Relationship:
The Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Foundation and the Rumour of an Anglo-American War.”
Journal of Transatlantic Studies 1 (2003): 234. Quoting Venn, Fiona. “A Futile Paper Chase.” Diplomacy and
Statecraft 1 (1990): 167. The Irish question had long been a thorn in the side of Anglo-American harmony, as
shown above. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was scuttled by the Imperial Conference of 1921 in deference to
American friendship.
Competitive naval building was the most significant of these three. C. Ernest Fayle wrote to Kerr of his
concern that the United States was basing its own naval calculations predominantly on the possibility of an
Anglo-American war. Lothian Papers, GD40/17: 98. Ostensibly to refute what they believed to be exaggerated
American claims of British naval superiority, the RIIA began assembling large amounts of data about the United
States’ naval capability and commercial shipping. Data gathered included figures on commercial tonnage, the
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During the official inauguration of the RIIA (then the BIIA) on 5 July, 1920, Viscount
Grey of Falloden advised the institute to “produce something like an annual register of
foreign affairs” which he further added “will not interfere with policy, but provide materials
from which politicians, statesmen and journalists can form sound opinion in regard to
policy.”241 In 1924 James Headlam-Morley, chairman of the institute’s Publications
Committee, recommended Arnold Toynbee to the position of primary author of the Chatham
House’s proposed Survey of International Affairs (then largely unfunded). Under Toynbee,
who remained the driving force behind the publication until 1954, the annual Survey became
the cornerstone of Chatham House research and an important tool for British study (and
conduct) of international affairs.
In addition to the RIIA’s publications (which also prominently included International
Affairs, first known simply as the Institute’s Journal), in 1925 the organisation developed a
“study-group system” which has since been widely imitated.242 These groups allowed
Chatham House to undertake a broader scope of more detailed research than the Survey alone
could provide. In 1928 groups met 139 times, a number which would grow significantly in
the next decade.243
number of merchant vessels, statistically detailed profiles of the network of American port cities, the number of
cruisers (including breakdowns of each ship’s armament, speed, and age), lists of tugboats and passenger
vessels, and any other information the RIIA could obtain about anything the United States government or its
private citizens owned that floated. This data, supposedly gathered to avoid a war with America, would have
been of great interest to the Admiralty in the event of one. See Lothian Papers, GD40/17: 99, 100.
Williams notes that “the ‘aftermath’ of the tension of the late 1920s was settled almost entirely in
America’s favour,” notably at Rapidan in 1929 where Britain recognized the right of the United States to naval
parity with herself (see below). Williams, Andrew. “Before the Special Relationship,” 245.
241 Morgan, Roger. “‘To Advance the Sciences of International Politics…’: Chatham House’s Early Research.”
In Bosco 123. Original in Chatham House Archives, 2/1/1e. Morgan’s article is a good guide for the
chronological evolution of interwar Chatham House publications, though analysis of the research is outside the
article’s scope.
242 Bosco, Andrea. “Introduction.” In Bosco 9.
243 Morgan, in Bosco 125.
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Present within these study groups are some of the most explicit expositions of the
benefits of Anglo-American cooperation, well documented by Parmar. Philip Kerr chaired
one such body called the “Special Group on Anglo-American Relations” from 1928-1929. In
the view of Kerr and the group, “the interests of the United States and Great Britain are…
nearly identical.”244 During the Second World War, with the impartial research mission of
Chatham House largely put aside, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin (a member of the Foreign Office
and the RIIA) strongly advocated for closer Anglo-American ties in a paper presented to the
Economic Group. The paper asserted the essential importance of American support of British
interests after the war. Together with the United States, “our economic control will be almost
world-wide, and our power to make a constructive peace will be irresistible.”245 Parmar states
the paper
represents a highly important trend of official opinion being
confidentially communicated to a private foreign affairs
audience that was not only connected with British
governmental and elite private opinion but also to
important pro-British U.S. and imperial elites.246
While these quotes do not contain any explicit references to the superiority of Anglo-Saxon
institutions or culture, nor to any civilising mission or divine destiny, they do contain a vital
element of Anglo-Saxonism: the critical importance of close cooperation between the British
Commonwealth and the United States. Anglo-Saxonism within Chatham House was a subtle
influence more than it was a prominently promoted ideal.
One weakness of Parmar’s excellent book is that it overemphasizes the degree to
which Curtis and Toynbee and others believed in an explicit racial Anglo-Saxonism. There is
244 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 80. Original in Chatham House Archives, 9/1.1, pp. 1-9.
245 Ibid., 82. Original in Chatham House Archives, 9/22b, p. 7.
246 Ibid., 81. The Ashton-Gwatkin episode is presented as evidence supporting the modified Gramscian theory of
power. See below for further consideration of this theory.
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much in their writings and letters which contained overtly racial elements of Anglo-Saxonism
– they often made reference to the “white man’s burden” and the world’s “backward
races.”247 But with the same breath these men asserted the innate capability of these races to
govern themselves. In a private letter from Philip Kerr to Lionel Curtis dated 15 October,
1918, Kerr wrote:
…the inhabitants of Africa and parts of Asia have
proved unable to govern themselves, not
because they were inherently incapable of
maintaining any kind of stable society if left to
themselves, but because they were quite
unable to withstand the demoralising
influences to which they were subjected in
[sic] some civilised countries.248
Furthermore, Arnold Toynbee wrote of Curtis (perhaps somewhat exaggeratedly) in 1966 that
Lionel was surely the first political thinker in the
Western World to hold and declare that non-
Western peoples had the same human right to
self-government as Western peoples and also
the same inherent human capacity for
governing themselves, so that the grant of self-
government to them was not only a moral duty
but would prove to be sound politics as
well.249
The denomination of Anglo-Saxonism practiced by both the Round Table and its heir sought
to dampen the theory’s more academically questionable racial elements. George Catlin, for
instance, wrote the following in 1941: “By ‘Anglo-Saxony’ is meant, not a racial, but a
cultural bloc, with common traditions, habits, culture and (by and large) political views. The
very core of that culture is a notion, not of race, but of freedom.”250 In their public writings
247 See Philip Kerr letter to Lionel Curtis dated 15 October, 1918. Quoted in Butler 68-69. See also John
Kendle’s chapter on India in 224-247.
248 Butler 68.
249 Toynbee, Arnold. Acquaintances (London: Oxford UP, 1967) 135.
250 Catlin, George. One Anglo-American Nation: The Foundation of AngloSaxony as Basis of World Federation
[sic] (London: Andrew Dakers, 1941) 20. The author’s choice to employ the term “Anglo-Saxony” instead of
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and some of their private letters, therefore, Chatham House members both affirmed all
humanity’s innate capacity to govern and rejected racial justifications for world order
(thought the extent to which they truly believed this is a subject for debate).
Parmar, in places, understands “Anglo-Saxonism” as a primarily racial theory: “In the
course of their attempts to build Anglo-American cooperation, it is possible to discern the
gradually decreasing reliance on racial imagery or language, that is, of Anglo-Saxonism.”251
For Parmar, it was a mostly racial theory which members of Chatham House and others
translated into secular terms; backward races became backward “areas” and the white man’s
burden” became “international trusteeship.”252 As this thesis has shown, however, racial
themes were only one component of Anglo-Saxonism. Chatham House members were not
merely translating racial Anglo-Saxonism (though the terms employed were admittedly
changing) – they were emphasizing other portions of the theory that Dilke, Fiske, and
Hawkins had developed some fifty years previously.
It is clear then that while the members of Chatham House were raised and educated in
an era that more enthusiastically embraced racial Anglo-Saxonism, before and after the First
World War many made conscious efforts to avoid and even refute it in their writings.
the more traditional Anglo-Saxonism is itself an indication of the author’s desire to distance his work from the
term’s earlier racial iterations. Catlin further squelches racial “Anglo-Saxony” on 43-49.
251 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 216. Also: “Lionel Curtis’s correspondence, for example,
is replete with letters about the racial (that is Anglo-Saxon) basis of the post-1945 world order.” Ibid., 67.
Parmar’s understanding of the term “Anglo-Saxonism” is difficult to determine with complete
accuracy. In other portions of his book, he recognises the existence of the theory’s other elements. In
considering Catlin, Parmar states “In fact, contained within Catlin’s analysis are most of the essential elements
of Anglo-Saxonism without the biological aspects.” Ibid., 72. Elsewhere he states “the proponents of federalism,
in CFR-RIIA circles, were deeply inspired by what they believed to be the redemptive power of Anglo-Saxon
civilisation, the only force capable of saving the world from totalitarianism.” Ibid., 196. Emphasis added.
In places, therefore, Parmar appears to believe that the racial element was not just one component of
many within Anglo-Saxonism, but an essential one. This dissertation has argued that racial elements within
Anglo-Saxonism were not essential, though they were conspicuously emphasised by intellectual generations
preceding Chatham House. Ultimately, Parmar recognises that the “language of biologically determined racial
superiority was generally jettisoned by the 1920’s and 1930’s, in favour of culturally determined explanations of
the inequality of nations and peoples…” Ibid., 71. Emphasis in original.
252 Ibid., 216.
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Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that these men came of age in an environment charged with
racial conceptions of social Darwinism and a near-ubiquitous conviction in the superiority of
the Anglo-Saxon “race.” In reading Parmar and other scholars, therefore, it is important to
bear in mind that many of these men did not believe in racial Anglo-Saxonism, so much as
they were affected by it.
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Clandestine Cooperation
Lionel Curtis continued to promote Anglo-American cooperation as the cornerstone
of his vision of a new global paradigm. In a 1927 speech to a conference of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, he told his audience “the first thing I want to say to you is that the future
happiness of the world depends upon one thing more than any other, American and British
cooperation.”253 And the Prophet had been practicing what he preached, constantly
corresponding with members of the Council on Foreign Relations and arranging meetings and
conferences of transatlantic minds.
Lecturing with Toynbee at Boston’s Williamstown Institute of Politics during the
summer of 1922, for instance, Curtis invited the institute’s president, Harry Garfield, to
convene a future conference of international scholars in Oxford. Two years later on 30 March
1923, Curtis wrote to Shepardson that he hoped that the CFR might send representatives to
the conference with “experts on international affairs from the whole English-speaking
world.”254 By using his “extraordinary power of enlisting or conscripting other people to do
what he wanted,” Curtis helped to keep the embers of elite Anglo-American friendship
developed at Versailles burning through a period of tension between the two nations.255
Kerr also cultivated elite transatlantic friendships and promoted cooperation between
Chatham House and the CFR. In a 1929 letter to Charles Webster (a RIIA member then in
America), Kerr wrote about the “far-reaching effect on inside opinion” a recent Foreign
253 Curtis Papers, 126.168. Speech presented at the University Club of Honolulu, 2 August, 1927. In the same
speech, Curtis acknowledged the tensions between the two nations: “Don’t make any mistake…we British are
just as suspicious and jealous of you as you are of us.”
254 Curtis Round Table Papers, 872.31.
255 Toynbee, Acquaintances 140.
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Affairs article by John W. Davis was sure to have in Britain.256 Kerr further stated the
importance of articles advocating closer Anglo-American relations:
[they] filter across the Atlantic and are seriously
considered in student and expert circles. This
process of group thinking on each side of the
Atlantic has already produced a profound change
of thought among what may be called the
intelligentsia on both sides.257
For Kerr and Chatham House, elite cooperation would pave the way for an expanded
American role on the world stage: “as a world power she has both a moral duty and an
economic and political interest” in the prevention of war.258
At the same time Kerr and Curtis were promoting cooperation between Chatham
House and its American sister institute, tensions between their two nations necessitated a
certain level of discretion. In a 1929 letter to Whitney Hart Shepardson, Kerr proposed the
two organisations share information at a summer meeting, possibly in Canada; but rather than
promote the meeting as a Chatham House-CFR exchange, Kerr suggested that it be
“nominally between the various delegates to the Institute of Pacific Relations… who could
meet in this way without attracting newspaper publicity.”259 CFR members were similarly
hesitant to be seen by the public as “chummy” with the RIIA; in a 1925 letter to Curtis,
Shepardson expressed concern over how a representative of the CFR had managed to obtain a
list of Chatham House members.260 As important as the promotion of Anglo-American
cooperation was to the CFR and the RIIA, it was a goal which had to be clandestinely
256 Lothian Papers, Kerr to Webster, 27 March, 1929. GD40/17/103.23.
257 Ibid.
258 Butler, 120.
259 Ibid.
260 Curtis Round Table Papers, 872.101. Shepardson to Curtis, 18 December, 1925.This letter elicited the Curtis
response quoted above in note 226, further evidence of the RIIA’s hesitancy to be publicly associated with the
CFR.
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pursued. Fortunately for Chatham House, Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr, and other Round Tablers
within the Institution’s ranks had experience in this regard, as shown above.
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Rapidan
An important Anglo-American conference overlooked in its own time and largely
forgotten since by academia is the Rapidan Conference of October 1929. Labour Prime
Minister Ramsay MacDonald met with Republican President Herbert Hoover to address
primarily naval issues for several days at Hoover’s Virginia retreat which gave the
conference its name. Several reasons contribute to the neglect of this meeting.
First and foremost Rapidan’s timing was unfortunate. While October 1929 has a
prominent place in the world’s history, its distinction has nothing to do with Rapidan. Black
Thursday and Black Tuesday (24 and 29 October, respectively) ushered in the Great
Depression just two weeks after the conference’s conclusion. Hoover’s legacy became
unemployment and Hoovervilles. His contributions to international diplomacy have become
all but forgotten. MacDonald likewise fared poorly during the Depression and in history. His
government’s inability to adapt, his expulsion from the Labour Party, and his deteriorating
mental health overshadowed his diplomatic achievement at Rapidan. In regard to
international relations, he became more remembered as a Prime Minister who tolerated Adolf
Hitler and the resurrection of a martial Germany than for his contributions to Anglo-
American relations.
The conference’s failure to achieve all its explicitly stated objectives also plays a role
in its relative neglect. Ferrell lists five “special subjects” discussed at Rapidan: “a third article
to the Kellogg pact, liquor smuggling [from Canada into America], dismantling of British
naval stations in the Western Hemisphere, freedom of the seas, [and] technical details of
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disarmament.”261 The 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact had been a general renunciation of war
signed by dozens of nations, though the pact itself had no real provision for enforcement.
Secretary of State Henry Stimson sought to add a third provision to establish a mechanism for
conciliation. Despite lengthy talks, this was dismissed on the grounds that the American
public might bristle at the addition, which was largely superfluous anyway as the League of
Nations contained provisions for conciliation, while previous treaties bound the United States
to conciliation as well.
Canadian liquor smuggling was soon taken off the table, as was disarmament (the
decision to leave technical details of disarmament to experts was an indication of the
sensitivity of the subject). Though MacDonald initially pledged “to dismantle the fortification
and harbour naval [sic] facilities” of British possessions in the western hemisphere, the
Admiralty later convinced him such an action would be unwise.262 In light of these specific
failures, the conference’s real significance can be overlooked.
Freedom of the seas “had perplexed peoples, publicists, international lawyers, and
their governments since the late Middle Ages.”263 While Rapidan too proved incapable of
completely unravelling this Gordian knot, it was in these negotiations that Rapidan took on
its real significance. The greatest implication of the conference was MacDonald’s recognition
of an American right to naval parity with the British Empire. Addressing the Senate on 7
October, MacDonald stated “…we have said ‘What is all this bother about parity?’ Parity?
Take it, without reserve, heaped up and flowing over.”264 This constituted a tremendous shift
261 Ferrell, Robert. American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933
(London: Oxford UP, 1957) 83.
262 Ibid., 81.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid., 85. MacDonald’s public appearances and speeches were well received. This served to cool much of the
public Anglophobic sentiment that had been steadily burning throughout the decade.
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in British foreign policy: “It was in all but name the abandonment of two centuries of British
claims to naval supremacy to the benefit of the United States and thus a major watershed that
led to the ‘Special Relationship’ of today.”265
Rapidan was also significant for Chatham House and the CFR. During the conference,
Stimson approached MacDonald with an article advocating a powerful World Court. Its
author was Philip Kerr, who wrote it for Foreign Affairs. Williams states that “Stimson
actually gave it to the Prime Minister to read at Rapidan ‘and he agreed with [Kerr].’”266
While discussions about a strong World Court did not bear any fruit, this is nonetheless an
important testament to the awareness of the work of Chatham House and the CFR at the
highest levels of authority in both states.
At Rapidan Britannica looked her runaway square in the eye, recognised an equal and
opened the door for future partnership. The conference was a major recognition of the appeal
of transatlanticist cooperation the CFR and the RIIA advocated: “MacDonald was willing to
in effect bow to the CFR agenda for Anglo-American relations…”267 One of the most
significant impediments to Anglo-American cooperation had been removed, and the door
beckoning the United States to a more active international role opened a little more. As Kerr
wrote, a malaise which had hung over Anglo-American relations had been lifted.268 While
Rapidan became overshadowed by the London Naval Conference and more so the Great
Carlton records this as “the only success MacDonald had in the United States.” Carlton, David.
MacDonald versus Henderson: the Foreign Policy of the Second Labour Government (London: Macmillan,
1970) 117. Carlton’s account of Rapidan is somewhat questionable, however. It makes no reference at all to the
agreement of naval parity. He even includes contemporary quotes of high praise for MacDonald’s achievement
at Rapidan, while only remarking that they are “difficult to appreciate.” Ibid. These quotes are indeed difficult to
appreciate without knowledge of the conference’s most significant outcome.
265 Williams, Andrew. “Before the Special Relationship” 242.
266 Ibid., 243. Bracket quote by Williams. Original in Stimson Diary, “Memorandum of a Trip to Rapidan,” 5-7
October, 1929. Stimson Papers, Reel 126.
267 Ibid., 242.
268 Kerr, Philip. “Navies and Peace: a British View.” Foreign Affairs 8.1 (1929): 20.
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Depression, it nonetheless was a highly important concession by Britain to the United States
which augured a profound change in the nature of the Anglo-American relationship.269
269 Addressing the London Naval Conference, Ferrell states “there seems to have resulted little except a
publicizing of the previous agreement for naval parity arrived by Britain and the United States during the
Rapidan Conference.” Ferrell 104. Perhaps owing to the multilateral nature of the London conference, or its
effect on Japanese militancy, it has overshadowed Rapidan, as even a simple search of scholarly articles and
books will show.
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The Commonwealth Forgotten?
The push toward cooperation with the United States that Chatham House advocated
became a reality during the Second World War. Parts of the Institute itself became organs of
the state, notably the Foreign Research and Press Service and the Chatham House Institute of
Pacific relations Committee.
But the Institute which Curtis thought would be an heir to the Round Table that would
promote imperial reform in the direction of organic union never materialised. And yet, he and
the men of Majestic had established an institute that strove to produce impartial research
largely undertaken and arranged by academics. At first glance, it seems curious that Curtis
expected that such an organisation would pick up the Round Table’s banner of advocacy.
With further consideration, however, it becomes clear that this was not curious at all.
Curtis did not merely believe the commonwealth idea to be the world’s best available mode
of government – he believed that it was the logical conclusion to humanity’s development.
Furthermore, it was “the best attempt to carry out Christ’s teaching that the present-day world
has to show.”270 Curtis firmly believed an academic policy research institution would
naturally endorse the commonwealth principle and advocate its implementation throughout
the empire and the world.
Of course, this is not what happened. While effective in promoting closer Anglo-
American relations, the primary publications of the RIIA did not include prescriptions of
commonwealth for all the world’s afflictions. Toynbee’s Surveys were widely read, but did
270 Toynbee, Acquaintances 146.
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not present an explicit worldview like Curtis’. More and more Chatham House turned a deaf
ear to his commonwealth ideal, girded by Anglo-Saxonism. Toward the end of his life Curtis
found himself in a position familiar to men of advanced age: a venerated figure, respected for
a lifetime of contributions, but mostly just ignored.
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The Council on Foreign Relations: Beginnings
While the Royal Institute for International Affairs was establishing itself with relative
ease after Versailles, its sister institute in America was encountering difficulties. A new tide
of Anglophobia had swept over the United States once again, with many Americans feeling
that Britain had used her influence at the Versailles negotiating table as leverage to accrue
more territory for her empire. The rejection of the Covenant and the League of Nations had
rung in a new era of isolationism, a current which flowed against the liberal internationalism
the men of Majestic espoused. Floundering, Shepardson and Bowman turned to an old friend
of James Bryce: Elihu Root.
In 1921, Root was serving as the honorary chairman of an entity called the Council on
Foreign Relations, a dinner discussion group of prominent New York attorneys and bankers
with international connections and interests. The Council had been regularly meeting for
three years when Bowman and Shepardson proposed merging their own nascent organization
with Root’s, combining diplomatic expertise with “untold resources of finance.”271 The
Council agreed, and on 29 July, 1921, the two groups reconstituted themselves, retaining the
name Council on Foreign Relations. Committed to a bipartisan approach, George
Wickersham and John W. Davis became chairman of the board and president, respectively.
Wickersham had been William Howard Taft’s attorney general and the president of the New
York City Bar, while Davis had been Wilson’s Solicitor General and then U.S. Ambassador
to the United Kingdom. While the men of Majestic had altered their initial goal of
271 Grose Accessed via http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/inquiry.html on 29/3/11 at 16:10 GMT.
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establishing two branches of a single entity (the new CFR would not accept British
members), their fundamental objectives remained unchanged.272
The Council did not encounter as much difficulty in raising funds as Lionel Curtis did
for Chatham House, unsurprisingly. The CFR was located in the financial capital of the
world’s largest and healthiest post-war economy, with prominent bankers making up a
significant portion of its membership.
Once again, Inderjeet Parmar has provided the most comprehensive profile of the
leaders of the CFR from 1921-1946. Not surprisingly, the data again reveal a highly
educated, well-connected cadre of wealthy and socially active white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant
males. None of the leaders were Catholic, and no women were admitted until 1969. Twenty-
five per cent of the leadership were corporate lawyers (largely practicing on Wall Street), and
34 per cent were academics (largely from the Ivy League). A majority of the CFR’s leaders
were born in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, mostly in the 1870’s and
1880’s.273
With the Council’s early history and membership in mind, we may now turn to its
work.
272 Schulzinger 5-7. See also: Shoup, Laurence and Minter, William 13-17 (see footnote 58). Parmar, Think
Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 36-39.
273 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 38-46. Parmar also points out the inclusion of four Jewish
men, indicating flexibility subject to “like-mindedness.” Ibid.
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Research and Publications
The mechanisms for the development and distribution of research employed by the
CFR were very similar to its sister institute Chatham House. The CFR invited prominent
individuals in the field of international relations to address the Council every month (Georges
Clemenceau addressed the group in 1922), developed a series of expert study groups, and
published its own journal and reports.
Its most famous publication, the journal Foreign Affairs, has become one of the most
widely recognised and cited periodicals in the field of international relations. And much like
The Round Table, the Council did not want to produce a journal intended for mass
consumption. Rather, “it only wanted to attract the attention of the most important members
of the literate public.”274 Bundy states this was achieved “simply by sending copies to
influential peoples, who might then be induced to contribute or enlist others.”275 The process
did not consist of randomly sending issues to important men – Council members (themselves
influential men) promoted the journal in their clubs and offices, where many more men of the
“key leadership segments of American society” could be found.276 In this way, the CFR’s
perception of public opinion closely resembled Chatham House’s – as Curtis had stated at
Majestic, correct public opinion was the purview of a few discerning men capable of properly
analysing the facts of international relations. Having charted a prudent course, these men
could then shepherd general public opinion in the proper direction.
274 Schulzinger 8.
275 Bundy, William. “Notes on the History of Foreign Affairs.” Bundy recounts how Vladimir Lenin read and
marked upon an issue, which was eventually returned to the Council which still displays the issue. Accessed via
http://www.cfr.org/about/history/foreign_affairs.html on 18/5/11 14:29 BST.
276 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 137.
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Edited by Archibald Cary Coolidge and Hamilton Fish Armstrong (both present at the
Paris Peace Conference, the former a prominent member of the Inquiry and a “Man of
Majestic”), Foreign Affairs first appeared in 1922. From its very first issue, Foreign Affairs
strove to be an impartial magazine that would “not devote itself to the support of any one
cause” nor “represent any consensus of beliefs.”277 While occasionally giving space to
staunch isolationists such as Illinois Senator Arthur Capper, the journal largely advocated an
expanded international role for the United States.278 Elihu Root struck such a chord in the
magazine’s first article, “A Requisite for the Success of Popular Democracy.” In it, he stated
the following:
Our people have been taught by events to realize
that with the increased intercommunication and
interdependence of civilized states… a large part
of the influences which make for prosperity or
disaster within our own country consist of forces
and movements which may arise anywhere in
the world beyond our direct and immediate
control.279
He further added that isolationist demagoguery was injurious to the United States and that it
would end when “the American public more fully understands the business of international
intercourse and feels a sense of the obligations which it incurs by asserting the right to control
the conduct of foreign relations.”280 While Foreign Affairs claimed objectivity, “no reader
277 Coolidge, Archibald. “Editorial Statement.” Foreign Affairs 1 (1922): 1.
278 See Capper, Arthur. “The American Farmer and Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 1.4 (1923): 127.
279 Root, Elihu. “A Requisite for the Success of Popular Diplomacy.” Foreign Affairs 1.1 (1922): 6.
280 Ibid., 10. Charles Eliot also contributed an internationalist piece for the first issue, stating that partisan
politics contributed to the Senate’s defeat of the League of Nations, calling the American government’s
isolationism a “moral collapse,” and urging the United States to join the League of Nations without reservation.
Eliot, Charles. “The Next American Contribution to Civilization.” Foreign Affairs 1.1 (1922): 59-60, 65.
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could be fooled into thinking that the journal was anything other than a plea for a forward
United States foreign policy.”281
In addition to the articles of Foreign Affairs, pro-British partiality also affected
members of the CFR. As Parmar states, “the restricted backgrounds of Council leaders had an
important bearing on their world view and predisposition towards Anglo-American
cooperation.”282 Roberts adds that while the Council claimed to be “committed to no one
outlook,” it was in fact a stronghold for those Americans who believed in collaboration with
the United Kingdom.283 And as with the RIIA, study groups within the Council were
significant bastions of transatlanticism. A study group on Anglo-American relations formed
in 1928 “clearly exemplified the pro-British bias in the council’s worldview” and “attracted a
disproportionate share of important council members: Armstrong, Allen Dulles, Colonel
House, Shepardson, Walter Lippmann, Shotwell, and Philip Jessup.”284
Hamilton Armstrong’s papers record four primary areas of focus for the Anglo-
American study group. In rank, they are: “freedom of the seas… the limitation of
armament… Treaties of Arbitration [or what faith should be put in international law]…
Economic competition… Joint action of adoption of a common attitude in certain parts of the
281 Schulzinger 11. Schulzinger’s analysis is biting in places, specifically concerning the Council’s view of the
general public (many statements by CFR members justify Schulzinger’s occasionally sharp pen, such as Walter
Mallory, who said “the Council never takes part in affairs for the general public.” Grose. Accessed via
http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/ on 19/5/11 at 14:57 BST). Additionally, Parmar notes that Schulzinger
does not employ “any theoretical context at all: [the CFR] merely exists and acts, and its actions and words have
been noted (presumably) in some value-free way.” Parmar, Inderjeet. “The Issue of State Power: The Council on
Foreign Relations as a Case Study.” Journal of American Studies 29 (1995): 75. Bearing these facts in mind,
serious examiners of the Council are unadvised to ignore this work.
282 Parmar, “The Issue of State Power” 82.
283 Roberts, Priscilla. “The Anglo-American Theme: American Visions of an Atlantic Alliance, 1914-1933.”
Diplomatic History 21 (1997): 350.
284 Smith, Neil and Bowman, Isaiah. “Bowman’s New World and the Council on Foreign Relations.”
Geographical Review 76 (1986): 453-454.
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world, especially China.”285 As Williams has observed, the Council was astute in their
diagnosis of the greatest topics of concern for Anglo-American relations, a subject further
discussed below.286
In considering the effect of Anglo-Saxonism on members of the CFR, Parmar once
again understands it primarily in racial terms, providing a number of examples of racial
Anglo-Saxonism’s influence on men such as Hamilton Fish Armstrong, John W. Davis, and
Russell C Leffingwell. He writes the following about Leffingwell:
Russell C. Leffingwell, a director of the CFR over several
decades and trustee of the Carnegie Corporation provides
another example of Anglo-Saxonism. Leffingwell’s
correspondence contains numerous references to the
infirmities – moral and other – of Slavs, Orientals,
Asiatics, and, on occasion, Jews… English statesmen were
invariably praised for their straightforwardness and for
lacking ‘the deviousness’ attributed to them by the
‘Hebraic’ mind. In short, the only race that was beyond
criticism was the Anglo-Saxon…287
Parmar has demonstrated that CFR members such as Leffingwell were often more disposed
to racial Anglo-Saxonism (in this case explicit bigotry) than their Chatham House
counterparts. Their members were also influenced by non racial elements of Anglo-
Saxonism.
285 Williams, Andrew. “Before the Special Relationship” 239. Bracket quote by Williams. Original in Armstrong
Papers, Box 72, 7 November, 1928, pp. 1-2.
286 Ibid., 245.
287 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 70.
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A New Anglo-Saxonism: Romanticism in the Service of Pragmatism
While membership was rife with prominent bankers and academicians, the Council
“did not immediately walk into the favoured circles of foreign policy arbiters.”288 During the
1920’s it was not significantly involved in discussions within the State Department, despite
frequent speeches made by Secretaries of State at Council dinners. As with Chatham House,
the CFR became most significantly interwoven with official foreign policy apparatus during
the Second World War.
The desire for Anglo-American cooperation within both Chatham House and the CFR
was not a goal in and of itself. Rather, both elites believed it served the interests of their
nations. RIIA members believed a closer relationship with the United States would arrest the
decline of the Empire and secure a place for Britain in the future. CFR members believed
British friendship would ease America’s ascension to the world stage. These men, therefore,
were “hardheaded realists” who “tended to respect power above all else.”289 Their own
Anglo-Saxonist tendencies, therefore, served to further their goals for each of their countries.
It is now necessary to examine some of the scholarship examining the nature of the
relationship between these policy institutes and their states.
288 Smith, American Empire 200.
289 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 109. Roberts, Priscilla. “The Transatlantic American
Foreign Policy Elite: its Evolution in Generational Perspective.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 7 (2009): 173.
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Historiography
As previously mentioned, a number of modern scholars examining the CFR and
Chatham House offer only brief considerations or references to the trends and developments
of the late nineteenth century, often as a result of length restrictions. One such work is Paul
Williams’ excellent article “A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the
Chatham House Project, 1919-1939.”290 Employing a Gramscian framework, Williams
discusses how the Chatham House’s belief in the application of scientific principles to the
field of international relations led its members to believe they were “providing statesmen, the
attentive public and anyone else who was listening with the ‘facts’ of international affairs.”291
For Williams (and Parmar), this kind of impartiality is impossible – the men of Chatham
House held their own worldviews and were products of their age. So to what extent do these
and other scholars take into account the effect of the previous decades’ trends and
developments on the environment in which these men came of age? Can their works be
further illuminated by considering them in conjunction with the historical trends and
developments presented above?
The majority of the scholarly literature examining the Council on Foreign Relations
and Chatham House attempt to answer the question of the extent of these groups’ influence
on their governments – but the more important question to which discerning scholars devote
their energies asks what is the very nature of these organisations’ relationship to the state
itself, and what was history’s role in this relationship?
290 Williams, Paul. “A Commonwealth of Knowledge” 35-58.
291 Ibid., 51.
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Those who focus on identifying the ways in which the CFR and the RIIA affected the
state make a presumption (stated or unstated) about the character of these groups’ association
with the state; namely, that primarily one of these entities attempted to influence the other.
Perhaps the most conspicuous of these scholars are Laurence Shoup and William Minter,
whose 1977 book Imperial Brain Trust is a Marxist indictment of the CFR as a tool of “the
corporate upper class.”292 For Shoup and Minter, international policy during and after the
Second World War originated and developed among Council members, who then used their
official and informal influence to transplant it whole into U.S. foreign policy organs.
Throughout the book, the CFR more closely resembles the Illuminati than a policy
institute. According to Shoup and Minter, the Council provided the “intellectual rationale and
[led a] thrust toward global power,” helping to create a “single, world-spanning political
economy with the United States at the centre.”293 Thus, the CFR’s goals “remain, as always,
to influence the government and public opinion in favour of an imperial role for the United
States.”294 Shoup and Minter give no substantive consideration to the trends and
developments of the Victorian and Edwardian eras; as transatlantic Anglo-Saxonism would
surely have whetted the appetites of two scholars bent on exposing an elitist organisation’s
secret control of the levers of power, it is probable that Shoup and Minter were not
significantly aware of it.295 Though primarily a British invention, it was nonetheless potent
292 Shoup and Minter 6.
293 Ibid., 29.
294 Ibid., 50.
295 In places Shoup and Minter’s scholarship appears questionable. On p. 13, for instance, they indicate the
existence of an American Round Table Group established prior to the Paris Peace Conference. No such group
chapter existed, either before or after Versailles.
This error in scholarship may have its roots in Carroll Quigley’s books. In The Anglo-American
Establishment: from Rhodes to Cliveden (published in 1981, though it was written in the late 1940’s), Quigley
claims the existence of a “Milner Group” in the United States prior to the First World War (236). He believed
this “Milner Group” to be a powerful behind-the-scenes cabal pulling the strings of international affairs; one of
its organs was the Round Table movement. Quigley states that George Louis Beer was “a member of the Round
Table Group from about 1912.” Ibid., 139. While a contributor to the magazine, authorship alone did not confer
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within the circles the authors examine; furthermore, Anglo-Saxonism compelled involvement
in global affairs, a fact worthy of inclusion in a consideration of America’s entry onto the
world stage.
Carlo Santoro’s 1992 book Diffidence and Ambition: the Intellectual Sources of U.S.
Foreign Policy also examines the role of the CFR in the development and implementation of
a new American strategy in the conduct of its international relations.296 For Santoro, the
interaction of two concepts significantly cultivated by the Council allowed the United States
to accept a larger global role: “interdependence” and “national security.” Interdependence is
defined as “the conviction that fostering economic and financial interaction between
countries would of itself improve international relations” by making conflict mutually
detrimental to both victor and vanquished.297 “National security” is defined as military
preparedness in the face of a “potentially anarchic order of international society.”298
membership. There was no American Round Table Group (nor a Milner Group, for that matter), and Beer was
never a Round Tabler.
Quigley’s scholarship is questionable in the extreme. For instance: “He [Beer] gave a hint of the
existence of the Milner Group [when, in an article about Milner]…he said: ‘He stands forth as the intellectual
leader of the most progressive school of imperial thought throughout the Empire.’” Ibid., 140. Hints are not
evidence, nor can Beer’s statement even be reasonably offered as a “hint” toward the existence of a “Milner
Group.” Accessed via http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Quigley_Anglo_American_Establishment.pdf on
17/5/11 at 18:33 BST.
Schoup and Minter cite Quigley’s 1966 Tragedy and Hope, which also claims the existence of a
“loosely organized” American Round Table Group (p. 688). As a testament to the quarters in which Quigley’s
books most resonate, Tragedy and Hope may be accessed in its entirety via
http://www.911truth.ch/pdf/Tragedy-Hope-a-History-of-the-World-in-Our-Time.pdf.
From Schoup and Minter this specious scholarship spread to Kees van der Pijl’s 1984 The Making of
an Atlantic Ruling Class, which also cites an American Round Table Group in its third chapter. Accessed via
http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/atlanticrulingclass/ on 17/5/11 at 18:25 BST. Parmar notes van der Pijl took
“somewhat uncritically” from Quigley. Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 190. Ultimately,
Quigley, Shoup and Minter, and van der Pijl often contain analysis resembling conspiracy theories and
questionable scholarship.
296 Parmar states that while it is difficult to assign a theoretical approach to Santoro’s book, it contains pluralist
and neo-Gramscian tendencies. See Parmar, Inderjeet. “Resurgent Academic Interest in the Council on Foreign
Relations.” Politics 21 (2001): 36.
297 Santoro, Carlo. Diffidence and Ambition: the Intellectual Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview, 1992) 35-36.
298 Ibid., 36.
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Like Shoup and Minter, Santoro focuses on proving the influence of the Council on
the state. The primary weakness of the study is the lack of convincing evidence to this effect:
“the reader is asked to believe that, given how close the CFR was to the State Department and
given its volume of published output, it ‘must’ have been influential.”299 In one instance,
Santoro outlines the intersection of CFR membership and leadership in “economy, banking,
[academia], or in the civil and military administrations” and concludes “…it is not hard to
imagine the great importance of the discussions within the CFR in orienting the formation of
concepts on U.S. foreign policy during and after the war.”300 While the secretive nature of the
Council’s proceedings at this time makes it difficult to establish a connection, one cannot be
suggested without more proof than Santoro provides. Proximity alone is not influence.
Diffidence and Ambition examines the CFR to the near exclusion of Chatham House
(though an entire chapter is devoted to Anglo-American relations). And while one might at
first forgive this in light of the book’s focus on the intellectual sources of American foreign
policy, further consideration reveals this as a glaring omission. The mutual origins of these
groups, the personal friendships of their members, their shared worldview, and the
tremendous interconnectedness of their organisations make an examination of only one
imperfect. Although Santoro does give brief consideration to themes of Anglo-Saxonism, one
of the Council’s most important relationships is virtually ignored.301
299 Parmar, “Resurgent Academic Interest in the Council on Foreign Relations” 36. Emphasis in original.
300 Santoro 49. On the same page, Santoro commits a factual error in identifying J.F. Dulles as a member of the
Inquiry. While present at Paris, Dulles was not an Inquiry member (Santoro’s confusion may owe itself to the
Inquiry’s dissolution and reorganisation during the conference). See Gelfand 177-180 for Dulles’ role at Paris
and 337-342 for an Inquiry personnel roster.
301 The British state is often treated as a single, monolithic entity devoid of the complexity that characterised the
American foreign policy apparatus. In regard to Anglo-Saxonism, Santoro does state that elites of the two
countries “share a common language, cultural references, some democratic values, [and] Protestantism.”
Santoro 113.
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Inderjeet Parmar’s Think Tanks and Foreign Policy provides a balanced, thorough
approach in its consideration of interactions between the state and private policy institutes
(Chatham House and the CFR, specifically). In an analysis that considers a wide array of
literature surrounding the Council and the RIIA, Parmar tests the following theories of power
and policymaking: “pluralism, the corporatist school of U.S. foreign relations history,
instrumental Marxism, statism, and the Gramscian perspective.”302
Having examined all of these theories, Parmar makes a convincing argument for the
Gramscian perspective. For Parmar’s Gramscianism, “the state constructs public, and elite,
opinion by mobilizing or, rather, focusing and re-focusing and by cooperating with, certain
elements of civil society.”303 He adds that this theory “almost completely nullifies the
distinction between politics and civil society, between ‘state’ and ‘society,’ indicating the
ability of Gramscian thought to transcend the artificial boundaries between them and to
explain the behaviour and inter-relations of state and think thank officials.”304 This addresses
the question of who influenced whom by emphasising the state’s power, while also
recognising the interpenetration between policy institutes and the state. Power and policy
formulation, then, do not lie solely with private interests (as Shoup and Minter and other
instrumental Marxists believe) nor with the state (as statism maintains). Rather, during the
interwar period Britain and the United States marshalled existing private entities (Chatham
House and the CFR) with objectives and ideologies already in place that would serve the
state’s interest. In this way Parmar’s Gramscianism neatly answers many questions other
theoretical frameworks fail to address.
302 Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy 10.
303 Ibid., 220.
304 Ibid., 221.
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These theories speak to the nature of the relationship between the RIIA and the
Council with their states, but they do not consider ideation – for that, history is needed. It is
needed because, as this dissertation has shown, conviction in the importance of Anglo-
American cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic existed long before Lionel Curtis, Philip
Kerr, Isaiah Bowman, and Hamilton Armstrong. Starting after the conclusion of the
American Civil War, elites from both countries developed a belief that both nations were
somehow bound to one another. They developed the theory and language of Anglo-Saxonism
and admired each other’s institutions, notably a British interest in federalism.
These themes were transmitted through the decades, and they found fertile ground
among the minds of Round Tablers and the Men of Majestic. What distinguished Chatham
House and the Council on Foreign Relations from groups that had previously advocated
Anglo-American cooperation was their incorporation into official foreign policy apparatus.
This inclusion owed itself as much to the exigencies of the Second World War as any other
cause. The nature of this relationship has been well-analysed by Parmar. This dissertation has
outlined the inheritance left to these groups by Anglo-Saxonism, federalist reformers, and
Anglo-American history. It is clear that these trends, events, and personalities predisposed
elites on both sides of the Atlantic to the necessity of close Anglo-American cooperation, an
observation that has eluded some modern scholars, as the relative lack of scholarly material
examining Chatham House or both the RIIA and the Council shows.
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Conclusion
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This thesis has sought to illuminate the origins of important historical events and
trends in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in order to more fully understand
the foundations of the Special Relationship. By considering Anglo-Saxonism as a complex
and mutable theory with multiple components, this dissertation has shown its effect on the
Anglo-American relationship generally and the men of Majestic specifically. It has also
shown that social Darwinism lent this theory scientific credibility that allowed it to flourish
and extended its influence. Federalism’s role in British intellectual thought has also been
outlined, as well as its considerable impact on the Round Tablers and the membership of
Chatham House.
This dissertation has shown that Anglo-Saxonism is understood by many modern
scholars as a strictly racial theory. In fact, Anglo-Saxonism developed along many different
lines, taking many forms. It contained cultural, social, and institutional elements in its earliest
forms. Charles Dilke, for instance, had a racialised and yet highly inclusive brand of Anglo-
Saxonism that also emphasised the profound importance of the Anglo-Saxon global civilising
mission.
This thesis’ understanding of the broadness of Anglo-Saxonism has facilitated a better
analysis of its effect on the Council and Chatham House and their predecessors. A ubiquitous
belief in the primacy of Anglo-Saxon institutions existed within the Round Table
membership. Additionally, the commonwealth ideal and Anglo-Saxonism which Lionel
Curtis so vigorously promoted had many similarities with the men of Majestic’s ideas for a
new world order. Both emphasised a transnational bond that brought with it responsibilities
outside of a citizen’s duty to his own state.
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The influence of Anglo-Saxonism was limited in each country, especially the United
States. Anglophobia was a powerful force within American politics, playing a significant role
in determining both domestic politics and foreign policy. Anglo-Saxonism exerted more
influence on elites within each country during a time when small circles of elites held the
levers of power. The membership of the CFR and Chatham House were both decidedly elite
in nature. Additionally, the Council and the RIIA both engaged in Anglo-Saxonist rhetoric
and thought, showing its influence on their membership.
If the Special Relationship was embryonic during the closing decades of the
nineteenth century, the men of Majestic served as its midwives, delivering a sickly child that
required clandestine nurturing during the tensions of the interwar period. But these men
persisted – they persisted because many of the tenets of Anglo-Saxonism, such the mutual
mission of the United Kingdom and the United States and their belief in the innate superiority
of their common institutions, were not concepts these men were struggling to develop – that
had been the duty of James Bryce’s generation. Rather, these were now the underpinnings of
a transatlantic dogma, a series of shared assumptions, a private language elites of both nations
had been raised speaking. Reforming elites of James Bryce’s generation had also tried in vain
to effect change as elected officials – Lionel Curtis and the Round Table had pioneered a new
method of influence for the intelligentsia, one which the CFR and Chatham House would
emulate.
Consideration of Victorian and Edwardian Anglo-Saxonism is necessary to fully
appreciate the membership of the Council and the RIIA and their beliefs. The modern scholar
examining the Anglo-American Special Relationship who bears these facts in mind is better-
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equipped to produce an insightful analysis that adds to our understanding of it. As Aristotle
would instruct him:
“Indeed, in this field, as in others, it is best to behold the matter as it develops forth
from its beginning.”305
305 Aristotle. Politics. 1.1252a. Author’s Translation.
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